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This paper provides a quantitative empirical study of support for the China model in Africa. 
Using comprehensive and previously unpublished data from Afrobarometer’s sixth round 
(2014-2016) the paper offers the first large-n (n= 46741) multicounty (n=31) empirical 
evaluation of support for the Chinese model of development. The paper is structured around 
two research questions. First, what is the rate of preference in Africa for the China model? 
Second, what are the determinants that underlie this preference? 
The China model is a contested construct. An extended literature review is therefore 
employed to establish where the construct fits within existing literature and then identify the 
key features that can be measured by my model. The pursuing analysis has two main sections; 
one descriptive and one explanatory. The descriptive section seeks to establish what the rate 
of support for the China model is in Africa. This section also provides a summary of 
sentiments in Africa towards the Chinese engagement. This summary of sentiments is included 
for two reasons. Firstly, because no consensus exists on the tonality of sentiments towards 
China in Africa this topic is of interest in and of itself. Secondly, because, as the model will 
show, these attitudes are intimately linked to respondent likelihood of choosing the China 
model for development.  
The explanatory section utilizes a multilevel regression model to explore why Africans pick 
the Chinese model over other development models. The regression employs a broad set of 
variables on individual priorities for development, values on democracy and views on the 
Chinese engagement in the respondents own country. At the national level the model includes 
measures on country characteristics such as development level and regime type. The model 
also investigates the effect of an aggregate Chinese ‘footprint’ in individual African nations. 
This footprint consists of Chinese trade, foreign direct investment and development 
assistance. The data on Chinese FDI and AID is collected from innovative open-source 
research projects based in the United States.  
The paper finds considerable support for the China model in Africa. China was the second 
most popular choice of development model after the United States. In ten of the surveyed 
countries it was the dominant choice. The descriptive section finds that Africans are on 
average positive towards the Chinese engagement on the continent. The multilevel regression 
model finds that respondents who offer positive evaluations of China’s engagement in their 
own country are much more likely to choose the Chinese model for development. Individual 
values on democracy and individual preferences on development are not found to influence 
choice of development model. The likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese model 
decreases as a country’s level of development increases. Respondents nested within freer 
societies are, surprisingly, more likely to choose the Chinese model of development. Increased 
Chinese presence in the form of aid and foreign direct investment is found to make 
respondents less likely to choose the China model. While increased imports from China 
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Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will shake the world. 
Napoleon Bonaparte on China 
The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting  
 Sun Tzu 
 
1.0 Introduction 
China’s growing presence in Africa has raised both concern and enthusiasm. It has sparked a 
debate sprinkled with fancy terms such as neo-colonialism, Beijing consensus, soft power and 
world systems. In Africa China represents an alternative approach to development and aid. At 
times the country takes a contrary stance to Western donors and arguably undermines their 
efforts to promote good governance and democracy on the continent. The so-called China 
model1 has become a popular catchphrase for a broad set of policies that goes against the 
established Washington Consensus. The Chinese approach is put forth as an alternate path to 
modernity and development. But, if some commentators are to be believed, its popularity is a 
direct threat to Africa’s future as it undercuts progress made over the past decades.  
This paper provides the first ever empirical evaluation of preference for the China model of 
development in Africa. It is structured around two fairly simple research questions. Firstly, 
what is the rate of preference in Africa for the China model? Second, what are the 
determinants that underlie this preference? The paper uses previously unpublished data from 
the Afrobarometer survey to measure individual Africans’ support for the Chinese model. 
Multilevel modeling techniques are utilized to root out explanatory factors at both individual 
and national level. A broad set of data has been collected to measure the national level 
variables. The paper offers an analysis of impact of factors such as regime type, development 
level and the national level footprint of the Chinese engagement measured through aid, 






allows for an exploration of effect of both macro and micro level variables, as well as the 
synergy between them. 
While the questions raised by this paper are straightforward the implications of the answers to 
them are complex. Empirical finding such as these hold potential consequences for both 
literature on the so-called China model, for the debate on the Chinese engagement in Africa, 
and for the discussion around China's rising soft power. 
Chapter one of the paper is structured as a broad literature review and it outlines current 
scholarship on the Chinese model and shows its origins within international relations debates. 
The chapter situates this paper within the larger body of literature on shifting power within 
international relations, soft power and African development. Lastly the chapter explores how 
the rise of the China-model holds consequences for African development and how it relates 
directly to rivaling theories of modernization. Chapter two goes through the research 
questions, presents the model, hypotheses and method for testing these hypotheses. Chapter 
three outlines the findings to my descriptive questions and displays the level of support for the 
China model in Africa. Importantly, the chapter also provides an overview over African 
sentiments towards China. This is done for two reasons. Firstly, no consensus exists on the 
tonality of African sentiments towards China. These findings are therefore interesting in and 
of themselves. Second, as the paper will show; sentiments towards Chinese intervention in 
individual countries are intimately connected with respondent likelihood of choosing the 
Chinese model of development. Chapter four discusses the results of the modeling and how 
we should interpret the multilevel logistic regression model. Chapter five discusses the impact 
of the papers findings on the study of China’s engagement in Africa, the notion of an 
alternative Chinese model of development and the China’s soft power on the continent. The 
paper then ends with a brief summary.   
 
1.1 Problem and literature review 
This paper is exploring unknown territory. No article has previously empirically measured 
support for the China model in Africa. The study of a unique Chinese development model is 
not established within Political Science and while it has received some attention as a separate 
development paradigm in International Relations and International Political Economy there 
has been relatively few papers written on the topic. So while the China model has become a 
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popular topic for discussion, no consensus exists on what it is. Often the China model is 
defined by what it is not, a version of the Western modernization paradigm, rather then what 
it is. Nor for that matter is there any agreement over what theoretical framework should be 
used to analyze it. This necessitates a lengthy literature review that ties the dots together and 
places the China model within a broader scope of literature. The review explains how the 
seemingly relativistic China model can be broken into components that we can test in the 
regression model outlined in the research design section (chapter two).  
Think of this literature review like an inverted 
pyramid; it shows how the debate around the 
China model fits with the ‘big picture’ debate of 
shifting power within international relations. In 
particular it will demonstrate how the model 
belongs within the realm of soft power. The 
review will show that the discourse and debate 
around the Chinese model emerged from the literature on rising Chinese soft power. 
Arguments over the China model’s impact in African are in essence discussions on how 
growing Chinese soft power shapes the African development trajectory. A summary of the 
rapidly expanding role of China in African development is therefore included. After 
establishing where the paper belongs within the broader body of literature it will review the 
limited research that has been done on public perception in Africa towards the Chinese 
intervention on the continent. The chapter ends by pinpointing the exact contribution of this 
paper within the much broader debate outlined above.  
Big picture  
China’s engagement in Africa can be seen at a number of levels of abstraction; from a global 
macro trend to a process manifested in individual actors. Hailed by some as one the most 
important geopolitical developments on the African continent since the end of the Cold War2 
it has attracted great attention from international relations scholars and analysts. It is treated 
like one of the hot potatoes in global affairs. The questions are many and exceedingly difficult 








a win-win relationship among equal partners?  Is China advancing its own development 
paradigm? And is it shaping Africa in its authoritarian image? 3  
China, Africa and future world order  
A key reason for our lacking ability to answer these questions has been political sciences 
inability to understand the Middle Kingdom. China’s rise and rapid advancement on the 
global stage collides head on with some of the key ideas developed by the political science 
discipline over the past decades. The country and its political system simply does not fit with 
most preexisting models. China is on the move and developing quicker than most have 
anticipated. But along the route to ‘modernity and prosperity’ it is avoiding some of the 
mandatory add-ons that development was supposed to entail. Despite predictions by leading 
scholars of China succumbing to democracy after the Tiananmen Square uprisings, China did 
not get swept away by democratizations ‘third wave’.4 While regime theory stipulates that 
authoritarian systems are inherently unstable, China is not brink of chaos. Rather, we seem to 
be witnessing an expression of authoritarian resilience. Over the past fifty years, scholars have 
disputed totalitarian regimes ability to adapt to modernity. China seemingly can. It has proven 
that an authoritarian state not only can scrape by in the modern world, it can prosper. China 
may be a unique case, but as Andrew Nathan highlights there may also be a more disturbing 
possibility; “that authoritarianism is a viable regime form even under conditions of advanced 
modernization and integration with the global economy.”5 Much of the concern around the 
China model relates to fears that China might spread its authoritarian system to the world. 
Critically, the authoritarian system in China is not static. Rather, it evolves to meet the 
changing political landscape. Andrew Mertha has shown how more actors have gained 
influence in the policy making process in China under the label Fragmented Authoritarianism 
2.0.6 There is seemingly no regime revolt occurring, rather a slow evolution of the current rule 














China’s immanent collapse,7 China INC is seemly running quite well. Notwithstanding a drop 
in economic growth (‘only’ to around seven percent a year) the country has yet to tear itself 
apart in social revolt.  
China then represents a problem, or put more kindly an exception to the rule, for 
deterministically minded social scientists. Seemly we are have not faced with “the end of 
history” and the conclusion of “mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of 
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” according to Fokuyama.8 
Rather we are faced with an alternative way of development and possibly even an alternative 
world system.  
China’s rise brings uncertainty for global strategists and worry over whether China will be a 
status quo power or a revisionist state that challenges the existing world order. As highlighted 
by Andrew Nathan there is growing concern that as China’s powers grow, it will strive to 
“remake the world in its authoritarian image.”9 China, in this respect represents a challenge to 
the existing world order. The country is already asserting a more confident image, be that in 
its actions in its backyard in the South China Sea, or at the levels of international 
organizations with the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While China 
at present does not pose a direct threat to the established world system and its foreign policy 
according to Nathan remains “essentially defensive”, there is no guarantee that it will remain 
so in the future.10 If the risk analysts at Eurasia Group are to be believed China will soon go 
from being a free-rider and rule-taker within the international system to being a confident 
rule-maker. A country that asserts its responsibly, but also claims its rights.11 China’s policy 
of regime-type neutrality and non-intervention in other states domestic affairs may well 
change if its strategic position is enhanced. Nathan points out that while China at present is 
not actively seeking to promote authoritarian rule, its existence and success might still place it 
as a form of role model and in a supporter position for an authoritarian alternative to 







































































































































China as the new superpower?
China will never replace the U.S.
China will/has replaced the U.S.
At its greatest level of abstraction some 
see China’s engagement in Africa as part 
of a larger rivalry for global dominance 
between the United States and China.13 
Building on ideas put forth by 
international relations scholars such as 
John Mearsheimer, who predicts that 
China cannot rise peacefully, they argue 
that China will inevitably end up in 
competition with the United States.14 This 
understanding frames Chinese influence 
in Africa, and rest of the world, according 
to a zero-sum game where what China 
gains of influence, the American’s lose. 
According to this line of thinking, China’s 
engagement in Africa holds huge potential 
consequences for geopolitics and future 
world order. A somewhat simplistic 
understanding would be that China fuels 
its rise and economic growth on African 
resources.  
According to the Ian Bremmer, China is 
the only country in the world that truly 









Source: PEW 2015 Spring Attitudes Survey 
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challenges the US led world order.15 Whether or not one believes that China will rule the 
world16, one does not need a far stretch of the imagination to see the country represents a 
considerable challenge to the existing world system on certain key areas. It presents an 
alternative economic model, what Bremmer calls state-capitalism. It promotes an alternative 
value and philosophical outlook based on Confucian ideas.17 It is a shining beacon of 
authoritarian success. And importantly, it represents an alternative method of development 




Deeply intertwined to discussions around the future of the world system is the debate around 
power and growing Chinese influence. A vital component of the discussions revolving around 
China’s engagement in Africa is an argument over whether the engagement represents a 
fundamental shift in international power relations. While China is yet to rival the United 
States in military might its economy has, despite the present cool-down, grown by double 
digits for more than two decades. This has led many to predict that China will soon overtake 
the US as the world’s dominant economy.18 China is at present recognised as a partial power 
when it comes to the classic metrics of state influence. International relations scholars stress 
however that dollars and tanks are not everything when it comes to accumulating power. 
While China is making measurable advances in economic and military power, an increasing 
body of literature is also focusing on an area where China is perceived to have an Achilles 
Heel; soft power. China’s rise an alternative and the discourse around global power transitions 
is as much a result of growing Chinese soft power as it is the country’s economic or military 
muscle.  
 
Joseph Nye coined the term soft power in the 1990s and defines it as “the ability to affect 













attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.” 19 Soft power then is the power of attraction. 
It is the ability to shape actions through the attractiveness of your values and your way of life. 
Shuan Breslin writing for Chatham House on the rise of Chinese soft power offered a more 
politics relevant definition of soft power as “the idea that others will align themselves to you 
and your policy preferences because they are attracted to your political and social system, 
values and policies.” 20 In other words, if you have to ability to attract you have the ability to 
get the outcomes that you want within the international arena. Nye argues that soft power has 
become increasingly important in the 21st century.  Globalization and the growing influence 
of information technology means that soft power has increased in relative importance to hard 
power.21 
 
From: Nye. The Future of Power, 2011 
 
The increasing importance of soft power and the fact that soft power can lead to hard gains is 
not lost on Chinese decision makers. China is investing heavily in its soft power. It was raised 
to presidential level in 2008 when Hu Jintou stressed the importance of strengthening Chinese 
appeal around the globe. President Xi has echoed the call for increasing China’s soft power.22 
According to David Shambaugh China is trying to buy their way to soft power and investing 
billions dollars a year with an expectation of getting a return.23 The Beijing Olympics and 
world-wide spread of Confucius Centers should therefore be seen as part of a wider strategy 
to raise the country’s appeal. Soft power has become a crucial component of Chinese overseas 

















foreign policy tool.24 This is partly due to a generational change within the Chinese 
leadership. The fifth generation of rulers under Xi Jinping, are less technocratic than their 
predecessors. While previous generations of Chinese leaders have come from engineering and 
natural science backgrounds, large parts of the current Poliburo have advanced degrees from 
the humanities. As Andrew Scobell outlines, this puts them in a better position to recognize 
that goals can be reached by employing the synergies between hard and soft power.25  
 
The contours of a distinct Chinese model can be seen in official policy statements. As China 
grows more influential on the international stage more attention is given to its expressions of 
vision and sense of self. Xi Jinping's articulation of a 'Chinese Dream' gained widespread 
coverage in Western media. The Chinese Dream is a collection of policy objectives with the 
intended goal of advancing China’s standing as a world power through increases in 
prosperity, promotion of social stability and ensuring a higher quality of life for citizens.26 
China’s campaign for soft power is part of a larger project to internationalize the voice of 
China in order for it so spread into popular consciousness and influence policy makers 
attempting to weight the consequences of China’s rise. Breslin sees it as an “attempt to 
promote a preferred Chinese idea of what China is and what it stands for, including an 
emphasis on the historical roots of current thinking, identity-formation and policy design to 
correct misconceptions among overseas audience about Chinese motivations and 
intentions.”27 
 
Some observers, like Scobell, argue that China’s soft power is limited as the country suffers 
severe drawbacks to its appeal due to its poor standing on human rights, limited cultural 
exports and its conflicts with Tibet and Taiwan.28 Prominent international relations scholars 
contend that China cannot rival the United States when it comes to soft power due to the 
inconsistencies of its domestic political system. Joseph Nye reasons that the country will 



















Medians with a favorable view of China
%
Source: PEW 2015 Spring Attitudes Survey 
system.”29 These scholars make the assumption that soft power somehow will be capped for 
countries that are undemocratic or have a poor human rights record, a notion that will later be 
challenged by the findings of the paper.  
 
A problem for soft power enthusiasts is that is a difficult enterprise to weight and measure it. 
How much soft power does a country have? Is it possible to measure any form of power 
before it is applied and results in a change in behavior? Although we cannot definitively 
weigh an entity of soft power that is floating around in the cosmos we can attempt to estimate 
it through proxies.30 One way of measuring soft power, as frequently used by Nye, is to look 
at opinion poll data. If survey data from PEW is to be believed, China is making soft power 
headway in Africa. Key insights from PEW’s 2015 Spring Global Attitudes Survey is not just 
that the world believes that China will surpass the United States. China also receives generally 
favourable views around the world. The most favourable assessments are found in African 
countries where China is seemingly getting great soft power returns to their investments. 
African countries surveyed by PEW 
provide particularly favourable 
ratings, with median of 70, the highest 
of the continents surveyed.  However, 
the survey has somewhat of a limited 
scope, as PEW only reached nine 
African countries (Burkina Faso, 
Senegal, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa and 
















this paper will offer us a more comprehensive sampling (n=31).  
 
While support for China is seemingly high in developing states, analysts differ on what 
sources that drive these positive evaluations. Shaun Breslin notes that China’s rise as an 
alternate economic trading partner appears to be “the major source of attraction” for other 
developing countries. However, he notes that it is challenging to separate out what are hard 
material factors such as economic support and trade from “softer attraction to values and 
worldviews.”32 In other words, it is difficult to establish whether China’s positive evaluations 
(and thereby presumably its soft power) stems from the country’s actions and hard exchange 
of trade and aid rather than attraction to their way of life. The papers use of multilevel 
modelling will address whether it is the Chinese footprint in hard material terms or individual 
values that determines respondents support for the China model. 
 
The emergence of the China model literature   
 
Notions of Chinese soft power are intimately linked to the rise of the China model-discourse 
in academic literature. As Breslin outlines, early impressions of Chinese model were often 
intertwined and connected “by those who saw the emergence of Chinese ideas and practices 
that might reconfigure power relationships in such a way as to undermine the position of the 
United States in East Asia and Africa, and ultimately to challenge both the political (liberal 
democratic) and economic (neo-liberal) bases of the global order.”33 One of the greatest 
alarmists on the rise of the China-model, Stephan Halper, warns us that the greater Chinese 
ambition is to construct a "network of likeminded states that challenges the West not 
militarily and economically, but conceptually and politically."34 The rise of the China-model 
is seen as a product of rising of Chinese soft power. As Matt Ferchen notes on the rise of the 
China-model-discourse; rivalry amongst “economic models is a battle of political 











the China-model question primarily digs into the preference for and popularity of the Chinese 
method for development this is underlined by a growth of Chinese soft power. If the model is 
popular, one can see it as a proxy for rising Chinese soft power in Africa. This is by no means 
purely an academic excise. Top level American officials have made voiced concern over how 
the Chinese model of state capitalism is used as an instrument of soft power in Africa.36 
Before I dissect the China model into its various components, a brief discussion on the 
discourse is needed. Firstly, it should be made clear that no consensus exists around what the 
China model is, or what policy recommendations it entails. Secondly, while the idea of a 
Chinese development model has become a popular theme in academic literature and a 
frequent topic for discussion in the world opinion pages, there is great disagreement around 
whether there actually is such a thing as a ‘China-model’. The following section will show 
that despite the seeming relativism of the concept key analytical features can be extracted, 
operationalized and measured.  
There have been several attempts at capturing a distinct Chinese development model on 
paper. Perhaps the most influential articulation was the ‘Beijing Consensus’. The notion of a 
‘Beijing Consensus’, as an alternative to the Western led ‘Washington Consensus’, was given 
flight by Joshua Ramo in his 2004 essay for the Foreign Policy Center. In it he described a 
Chinese model for development that involves a "commitment to innovation and constant 
experimentation."37 Ramo’s version of the China model is one that places China in a new 
position within the international system. He sees China as making a path for other developing 
nations that make them truly independent. Importantly, it offers an alternative route to 
modernity that does not go through the hurdle filled track established by the Washington 
Consensus. Ramo describes the Beijing Consensus as simply three theorems; the value of 
innovation, new measures of progress like “quality of life” rather than GDP, and above all 
stability. In this form the ‘Beijing-way’ is much closer to Deng Xiaoping’s “groping for 
stones to cross the river”, rather than Milton Freedman’s shock policy.  
While Ramo struck a popular cord, the notion that China represents an entirely different 
approach to development has received harsh criticism by China scholars. Shaun Breslin has 







rather than true depictions of the Chinese experience and development practice.38 Scott 
Kennedy debunked Ramo's concept as the ‘myth of the Beijing Consensus’. “Although 
ambitious", Kennedy writes "the original conception of the BC is not up to the task of being a 
worthwhile competitor" to the established Washington Consensus. This is not due to the 
Western approaches' superiority or worthiness, but rather because the Beijing Consensus as 
formulated by Ramo is a "misguided and inaccurate summary of China’s actual reform 
experience.” While Kennedy notes that there are elements of the Chinese development 
experience that merits close study, they do not add up to a distinct development alternative.  
He also highlights that there is little evidence that the Chinese decision makers themselves 
believe that there is such a thing as the Beijing Consensus. Viewed as a foreign creation, 
Chinese leaders have not yet embraced the idea of a Beijing Consensus and have therefore not 
promoted it actively as an ideological alternative.39 40 Matt Ferchen writing on the Beijing 
Consensus literature stresses the importance of not seeing the Chinese political system as a 
monolithic entity. The Chinese development experience is varied both across regions within 
China and across time.41 
Thereby, the notion put forth by Ramo that China has a complete development package ready 
for export is at best controversial. However, as Breslin argues the existence of a ‘China 
model’ may not be dependent on it offering a comprehensive blueprint for development.  
Rather it may lie in the fact that it has become a metaphor for ‘different’. Despite all the 
inconsistencies "China provides an important example of an alternative to the neo-liberal 
project that had come to dominate developmental discourse in the first part of the 
millennium.” In this respect, what the China model is and whether it truly represents the 
Chinese development experience is less important than what it is not. “It feeds into, and is 
itself fed by, an emerging sense of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ – an idea that China is 













to promote an alternative to the dominant global order.”42 In this respect, the Chinese model 
exists regardless of whether it truly represents a complete alternative to the Western led 
development agenda. Ideas matter, even if they do not represent absolute truth or accurately 
reflect historical reality. As Joseph Nye has eloquently illustrated, people’s perceptions can 
translate from a soft power resource into hard impact. Framing the way people view their 
world can have very real implications. Ramo was not blind to this effect. Although he never 
writes the words soft power, he argues that China is “building the greatest asymmetric 
superpower the world has ever seen, a nation that relies less on traditional tools of power 
projection than any in history and leads instead by the electric power of its example and the 
bluff impact of size.”43 
The authoritarian alternative  
Despite the seeming relativism of the concept, the literature around the Chinese development 
model contains key building blocks that make up the foundation of the model. One is the 
authoritarian and state driven path to development. As Andrew Nathan has alerted us to, 
China is a role model for and supporter of authoritarian regimes.44 Martin Jacques states that 
China has "obvious appeal" among the more authoritarian governments of the world.45 As 
discussed in the introduction, China's ability to deliver staggering levels of economic growth 
while at the same time remaining controlled by a single party defies the predictions of 
development theory and sends a powerful message those who see democracy as prerequisite 
for modernity. Bruce Bueno de Mesquite and George Downs point out that China has 
demonstrated to the world that a state can enjoy the benefits of economic development and at 
the same time steer clear of political liberalization.46 
China’s spectacular rise and its new role as development partner for pre-industrialized 
societies puts the China model it right at the center of the international development debate. 
The Chinese experience provides an important clue for the “chicken and egg question” of 
international development; the primacy of economic growth vs governance and democracy. 











sequencing)? And what is the link between regime type and economic growth? Western 
donors and researchers have argued that there exists a link between democratic rule and 
economic prosperity and, as a result, they have tied African aid funds to programs that 
promote governance and political liberalization.47 These programs are intellectually supported 
by the theories of academics like Joseph Siegle, Michael Weinstein and Morton Halperin who 
promote the notion of democracy first, development later. They argue that democratic 
transitions should be supported prior to economic expansion in developing states as 
democracies consistently outclass non-democracies on most metrics of economic and social 
well-being.48 To these scholars China’s actions in Africa may represent a problem. The 
Middle Kingdom has a poor track record when it comes to promoting good governance. 
Arguably it is undermining some of the effort made by Western donors by providing an 
alternative for regimes that would otherwise be forced to bow to Western adjustment 
programs.49 
However, causal relationships are difficult to identify within the social sciences and it might 
be that the link between democracy and economic prosperity happens in reverse. 
Modernization theorists like Semour Lipset and Ronald Ingelhart argue that economic 
development proceeds democratic rule.50 For scholars who propose that modernisation and 
economic development pave the way for democracy, China might be good news for Africa as 
long as it leads to long term economic development.  
Authoritarian control stretches beyond restrictions on electoral and civil rights; it also implies 
a specific type of economic governance. The Middle Kingdom is promoting a new economic 
policy that mixes market and state. The Chinese concept of a managed economy is clearly 













“We have one important piece of experience of the past thirty years, that is to ensure that 
both the visible hand and invisible hand are given full play in regulating the market forces.”51 
This approach is different from untethered capitalism promoted by the U.S. and different from 
the centralized planned economy of the old Soviet Republic. In his book The End of the Free 
Market, Ian Bremmer argues that “authoritarian governments everywhere have learned to 
compete internationally by embracing market driven capitalism." However, if authoritarian 
states completely resolve their hold over the economy, then market forces will decide winners 
and losers from economic growth. In the long run, they would risk enabling those who might 
use wealth to challenge political power. Authoritarian governments, such as China, have 
consequently invented a form of hybrid regime, or new state capitalism, which allows for the 
use of the economy for political purposes. This will sound very familiar to China observers 
who have illustrated how politics, party and business are tightly knitted in the Middle 
Kingdom.52 Bremmer sees China as the world’s foremost practitioner of state capitalism. He 
argues that the system of state-capitalism would have posted a far potent threat had it not been 
for China’s explosive growth and economic dynamism. In this sense free-market capitalism is 
being undermined by the Chinese model of economic governance.53  
This approach to economic growth is also reflected in Chinese ventures abroad. In Africa 
Chinese private and public investments are often difficult to separate and the Chinese model 
for development assistance may include a mix of private and public efforts.54 To Bremmer it 
represents a potential cause of friction within the international system. Importantly the use of 
state-capitalism is inherently political. It is a “form of bureaucratically engineered 
capitalism…a system in which the state dominates markets primarily for political gain.”55 
Free market defenders therefore see China’s hybrid system as a direct challenge to the 
existing economic order and as inefficient system that creates non-Pareto optimal outcomes. 















temptation for leaders in the developing world may be substantial.  In this respect the 
proliferation of the Chinese development model and China's growing presence and influence 
abroad represents a considerable challenge to the existing capitalist order.  
It is important to note that not all scholars share this notion that China bringing something 
new and different. Randall Peerenboom has an experience of “deja vu all over again”. China’s 
development pattern he argues is not all that unique.56 State developmentalism has previously 
been a model for country development in other Asian societies such as South Korea and 
Taiwan. Shaun Breslin finds that it is ahistorical to see the Chinese model as such a deviation 
from the norm when it shares similarities to previous Asian models and even earlier American 
and European state-guided systems of development.57  
However despite this, the discourse presents China as new alternative. The media enjoys 
presenting China as something new and different. It may be ahistorical, but perceptions do not 
necessarily reflect reality. For developing countries China offers an alternative path to 
modernity. It is an alternative to the Western lead system of international development and an 
alternative to the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ and its neo-liberal route to prosperity. 
And the debate around the best approach to development has accelerated in the wake of the 
global financial crisis.58 
Essence of a China model  
The discussion above illustrates that while a concept of a China model may be too relativistic 
to define the specific policy recommendations for development two key features can be 
identified: authoritarianism and promotion of economic growth over governance.  
This paper theorizes that there is a link between this narrative and individual preferences. This 
can be tested with the survey data. Firstly, we can investigate the link between priorities for 
development and choice of development model  China is on the whole seen as great economic 
trading partner for Africa; a partner that does business and builds infrastructure for any 
country regardless of regime type. Conversely, respondents are also likely to know that China 









respondents attach great relevance to governance they are less likely to be attracted by the 
Chinese model of development. Questions from the Afrobarometer allow me to probe whether 
those who find governance to be a priority are less likely to choose the Chinese model. On the 
other hand we can investigate whether respondents who say that economic growth is a priority 
are more prone to choosing the China-model for development. Value questions on democracy 
and authoritarian rule included in the questionnaire allows us to investigate the link between 
values and choice of development model. What country do respondents who value democracy 
and human rights choose as model for their country’s development? Certainly, if China is the 
authoritarian alternative we expect respondents who value democratic rights and rule to be 
less likely to point to China as a model for their country. Furthermore, the paper investigates 
whether respondents more likely to choose the Chinese model if they come from an 
authoritarian country.  
The importance of unlocking answers to these questions is underlined by the growing impact 
that China has on African development. As the next section demonstrates, there is little doubt 
that China will play a critical role for the future of Africa. Wide spread support for the 
Chinese model can alter the trajectory of development for the continent.  
China’s role in African development  
The debate over the Chinese model and its impact comes at a crucial time. China is playing an 
ever more important role in Africa and many experts believe that the continent is at a tipping 
point. While academic haggle over what constitutes a development model China is rapidly 
increasing its presence in Africa and playing an ever more important role for the future of the 
continent.59  
The Chinese faith in a strong central government, one that yields control over both the 
political realm and the market, affects the country’s approach to development. China’s 
engagement in Africa challenges the narrative on modernization, the role of aid and the future 
of the African continent. African leaders look to China for more than just trade and 
investment; they look to China for guidance. African decision makers want to learn from the 
Chinese experience and replicate its success. As an example, the South African government 






be implemented to aid African industrial development.60 According to research by Deborah 
Brautigam, China has invested in at least seven of these "economic and trade cooperation 
zones" spread out in six African countries.61 On a global scale China is asserting a more 
influential position in international development and promoting a shared vision for growth 
along with the other BRICS nations. Xi Jinping asserted the more active Chinese role during 
the 2013 BRICS summit in Durban South Africa. 
“We should jointly participate in the setting of international development agenda, fully 
harness the productivity and material resources accumulated in the past, fulfil the UN 
Millennium Development Goals, narrow the North-South gap in development, and make 
global development more balanced”.62 
For African countries this offers a strong ally in the fight against poverty and 
underdevelopment. Zhang Chun highlights how China and Africa have converging long term 
visions for development. Xi's 'Chinese dream' and the African Unions 'Agenda 2063' share 
overlapping policy positions and shared goals.63 
The growing African interest in the Chinese experience comes at a key moment in history. 
Analysts are predicting an African boom and renaissance. The headlines are turning. From 
being the Economist’s hopeless and lost continent it is now the hopeful and rising continent.64 
The most positive observers are predicting that the Next Africa will change the way people 
think about the continent. The long-standing narrative of an Africa detached from the global 
economy and ravished by conflict and corruption is waning. Over time we will witness the 





















“Africa is no longer the ‘basket-case’ of yore.” It is no longer the continent of despair and the 
endless drain of development resources to no avail. Africa is on verge of becoming a 
competent agent in global affairs. Rotberg is in good company in believing that the sum of 
transformations ongoing in Africa will lead to a brighter future. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), numerous consultancies, and seasoned analysts, firmly believe that sub-Saharan 
Africa is on the verge of a breakthrough.66  
But while the future may look bright, many analysts claim that the present is still quite bleak, 
and that it holds a number of challenges. There is no guarantee that the positive trend will 
continue for Africa, and the current progress might be more fragile than it looks. Tom Burgis 
highlights that Africa is booth rich and poor at the same time. Africa holds about 30 per cent 
of the world’s reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals. The continent also accounts for about 
14 per cent of the world’s population. Yet, its share of “global manufacturing stood in 2011 
exactly where it stood in 2000: at 1 percent.”67 Sadly, this metric has not improved much 
since. Burgis argues that the African development miracle is in reality a mirage. Resources 
account for 66 percent of Africa’s exports, and little added value comes in return.68 Africa’s 
future then is largely tied into commodities, and as Moyo shows in Winner takes All the surge 
in commodities has both potential upside and considerable downsides.69 The latest downturn 
in the Chinese economy has sparked fear that demand for African resources may dwindle in 
the future. China and Africa’s economic faith appear to be deeply intertwined.70 China has 
become dependent on African resources and commodities to fuel its growth. Africa on its side 
has rapidly become dependent on Chinese trade and investment. A research paper form the 
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export growth for every one percentage point decline in Chinese domestic investment growth. 
This effect is perceived to be even greater in resource-rich places like Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Zambia and South Africa.71 A prolonged cool-down in China could therefore have 
dire consequences for economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Martin Jacques ties the rapid Chinese advance in Africa to China’s ever-growing need for raw 
materials to fuel its economic growth. The launch of the ‘Going Global’ strategy in 2001 was 
according to Jacques “primarily intended to foster a closer relationship with commodity-
producing countries and thereby secure the raw materials the country urgently required for its 
economic growth and huge program of urbanisation.”72 Chinese trade with Africa has seen an 
explosive growth in recent years. As the graph below highlights Chinese-African trade 
accounted for a mere 40 billion in 2005. In 2014, however, exchange between China and the 
continent had risen more than fivefold, to 222 billion dollars.  
State owned companies are at the heart of the Chinese government’s foreign trade strategy. 
China’s state-owned energy companies ensure that the state secures access to the energy it 








full political support of the Chinese state these firms operate with considerable comparative 
advantages against their Western rivals.73 
China represents both an opportunity and a challenge for Africa. On one hand, China provides 
a huge market for African commodities. China is also a considerable provider of foreign 
direct investment. A recent report produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit finds that 
Africa is China’s predominant investment destination. The numbers are substantial, China 
invested nearly twenty billion dollars in 2013 and, importantly, Chinese decision makers have 
announced plans for a significant increase. The report stipulates that while investment in 
infrastructure makes up a considerable portion of investment, energy and mineral resource 
extraction attracts most of the FDI.74 Chinese AID to Africa has received growing attention in 
recent year despite the fact that little hard evidence has been available due to Chinese secrecy. 
The narrative in the West has been that China is flooding Africa with development funds, 
often directing the money to authoritarian regimes. Mosies Naim described it as “toxic” funds 
directed at rogue regimes.75 President Obama in an interview with the BBC said China “been 
able to funnel an awful lot of money into Africa, basically in exchange for raw materials that 
are being extracted from Africa.”76  
Researchers from the AidData project (description in methods chapter) argue that this 
narrative does not hold water. Claims that China has a preference for the autocratic and 
corrupt or for the resource rich are not supported by their data. Furthermore, AidData finds 
that Chinese development assistance tends to be allocated toward poorer countries. When 
comparing a broader set of finances that includes “other official financing” and “vague 
official financing”, funds that have less than the 25 percent grant element stipulated by the 
OECD, they find that the United States and China are nearly matched in terms of absolute 































the figures show that China is among the largest contributors of development assistance to 
African countries. Statements from the Chinese Export-Import Bank indicating that China 
would provide one trillion dollars’ worth of financing to Africa by 2025 should be taken with 
a certain degree of reservation, but indicates intentions for growing engagement.78 
It is not just the absolute 
numbers that matter; 
many have expressed 
enthusiasm over China’s 
efficient method of 
assistance. As 
highlighted in a 2008 
World Bank report, 
China cheaply and 
efficiently builds much of Africa’s infrastructure.79 The rapid pace of project advancement, 
from planning to completion is unmatched by other development partners who frequently 
weight down projects with bureaucracy and conditionality. The enthusiasm for the Chinese 
way of doing business is also reflected among the African populous and university elites. As 
Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong finds there is considerable enthusiasm on African continent 
for the Chinese way.80 However, concerns remain around whether the approach undermines 
other development agendas. Worries arise around whether the Chinese approach could 
weaken or even reverse some of the progress made on governance and democratic 
transition.81 China’s non-intervention policies and its willingness to cooperate with autocratic 


















repercussions might undermine long-term development.82 China’s willingness to trade with 
any partner has set of fears that it may escalate conflicts. China’s supply of weapons Sudanese 
government that were used to kill civilians in Darfur is one example frequently cited by 
critics.83 Development economists like Robert Rotberg stress that the growth in Africa has not 
purely been the result of the rise in commodity prices. It has also at least in part been the 
product of “fundamental shifts in governance and leadership”, as well as the rise of a potent 
African middle class.84 Delivering quick, but uncritical aid that props us ruling elites may 
reverse these positive trends. Furthermore, while China completes impressive projects in 
record time little skill is transferred to African workers who partake,85 fuelling speculation 
that the Chinese engagement may lead to a short term upside, but little in terms of lasting 
change on the African continent. 
 
“Broad brush overview”: What we know about African public perception towards 
China   
Despite this explosive growth in relations relatively little academic public opinion research 
has been conducted on China in Africa. As Strauss and Saavedra have highlight, much of 
what has been published to date has been “broad brush overview or opinion piece”, with little 
appreciation for the complexities and nuance. The African continents 54 states and countless 
ethnic identities and societies are clashed together under the broad label of ‘Africa’.86 Almost 
no public opinion research has been conducted that looks specifically at African sentiments 
towards the Chinese engagement. As a result speculation has often taken the place of solid 
data. ‘China in Africa’, is rather than the product of a single force enacting a causal change to 
a single variable, an incredibly complex process of millions of individual actors. It holds 
consequences for the individual lives of millions and raises important questions for 















depend on, and interact with, developments at the micro-level.87 While the construct of 
‘China-Africa’ offers useful analytical properties one should recognize the complexities of the 
process. Any analysis that seeks to understand the underlying causes must therefore also 
utilize a holistic form of analysis that bears in mind the various levels and how they interact. 
This paper aims to tie the macro and micro levels of abstraction together and answer the 
largest of questions with the smallest of data. It does not aspire to capture all facets of the 
phenomena, but by being data driven and counting the voices of Africans in 31 separate 
nations it seeks to provide an empirically supported analysis. By utilizing both national level 
data and individual survey responses it hopes to say something valuable about one of the 
largest trends in global affairs.  
The lack of public perception research stands in stark contrast to recent years’ steeply 
expanding academic interest for Chinese engagement in Africa in a broad sense. The topic has 
been raised in numerous books and articles that have covered everything from qualitative 
studies of migrants to grand theories of international relations.88 Underlying all of these 
contributions is a heated debate around the “true nature” of the relationship. Terms such as 
neo-colonialism, a second scramble for Africa and resource depletion are frequently 
mentioned. China in Africa is now a hot topic in both academic and media writing. China is 
on one hand seen a welcome competitor to the aid based system of the West, tipping the 
balance of the global economic system more in favor of African countries by giving them 
increased bargaining power. However, China is also seen as an exploiter of African 
economies with little vested interest in the continents long term development. Concerns 
around cooperation with rogue regimes undermining human rights, degradation worker rights 
and wages as well as damaging the local economies by creating a tsunami of cheap Chinese 

















There have been a number of contributions that deal with China’s soft power in Africa.90 
However, due to a lack of data there have been few attempts to quantify how much of 
headway China is making in winning over “hearts and minds” on the continent. Consequently, 
there have been few attempts to seek out the determinants of Chinese soft power in Africa, 
although a number of potential sources have been identified.91  
These shortfalls have partly been due to the aforementioned lack of solid public opinion data. 
There have been few attempts at continent-wide data collection on African public opinion 
towards China and, henceforth, little empirical research addressing African perceptions of 
Chinese involvement. The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) has been asking 
comparative questions about the Chinese intervention, but with a limited coverage of African 
countries. Further, PEW surveys have also probed questions on China, but again with limited 
coverage.92 Individual research papers have employed survey technics for data collection. One 
example is the aforementioned study in China Quarterly by Sautman and Hairong who survey 
two hundred and fifty respondents in universities across nine African countries.93 While the 
study offers valuable insights into perceptions among university elites its findings cannot be 
generalized to the broader public. The Afrobarometer first included a question on China in the 
fourth round of surveys in 2008. Round six of Afrobarometer promises to offer the most 
comprehensive broadside of questions on China yet, with a total of six questions relating to 
opinions regarding Chinese involvement in their given country. Importantly, this round of the 
Afrobarometer includes the first large-n data on preference for development model which 
allows for a quantitative analysis of support for the China model.  
The few that have written research based on empirical data have indicated that there is a 
distinct gap between the media’s frequent representation of large scale anti-Chinese 

















policymakers have questioned what we truly know about the African public’s perception of 
China.95 Due to the lack of sufficient survey data, current research into public perception 
towards China in Africa has been mostly qualitative in nature. These papers have tended to 
rely on interviews and focus-groups. While they provide a valuable contribution, little can be 
said with authority about the bigger trends.96 Research has speculated about what is driving 
the negative perceptions without explaining why they think it is relevant to probe these 
negative sentiments. Due to the lack of rigorous quantitative data collection researchers have 
been unable to determine whether these sentiments represents a deeper underlying tendency 
of resentment towards the Chinese or whether it is merely anecdotal in nature.   
One Afrobarometer paper, based on the fourth round of the survey, has been written on 
continent wide perceptions of China in Africa. Gadzala and Hanusch from Oxford University, 
find that African perceptions against China are nearly equivalent to those held against the 
West.97 The paper utilizes multilevel modeling to estimate the effect of both individual values 
and national level economic data. The article finds that increasing Chinese imports yield more 
negative African sentiments, while foreign direct investment has a negligible impact on public 
perception. Interestingly the paper finds that Africans who attach value to democracy and 
human rights are overall critical to the Chinese influence in their country. While this paper 
represents an effort at utilizing quantitative data from a comprehensive research survey it is 
never the less hampered by the fact that the fourth round of the Afrobarometer merely 
contains a single question on China.  Furthermore, Gadzala and Hanusch choose to focus on 






















two economic variables chosen, FDI and trade balance, surely represent solid descriptive 
variables when measuring macroeconomic impact. However, when it comes down evaluating 
the impact on individual perception it seems unlikely that the average person would be tapped 
into the latest statistic on trade balance. Contrary to the paper by Gadzala and Hanuch, this 
paper seeks to test for the impact of people’s perceptions of their respective countries 
economic development, rather than the true statistic. In addition FDI, trade and AID is 
employed as collective measure of the Chinese footprint in individual countries. This is a 
much broader dataset then the one employed by Gozala and Hanuch and the open-source 
collection methods allow for greater accuracy.   
1.2 Contribution of the paper  
New survey data covering thirty one countries allows for the first comprehensive evaluation 
local public opinion in Africa towards the Chinese involvement on the continent. Quantitative 
empirical research on public opinion within Africa towards the Chinese has so far been close 
to none-existent. The few research papers that have been written on the topic have used small 
samples or been of a qualitative nature. So while many proclaim to know the true nature of 
African sentiment towards the Chinese, few have been able back their claim with solid 
empirical data. This type of research is sorely needed to inform the debate surrounding China 
in Africa and help turn media reports and academic literature away from speculation and 
dogma.  
The paper utilizes a more extensive set of data then what has previously been available to 
researchers. The Afrobarometer contains a question on the preferred development model 
which allows for the first empirical testing of support for a Chinese model of development. 
Beyond just outlining and quantifying the level of preference for the China model in Africa 
this paper aims to go one step further and seek out the explanations for this choice. In addition 
to metrics collected from the survey this paper employs innovative open-source measures of 










2.1 Research Questions 
This study travels into unknown waters as no empirical evaluation of support for the China 
model has yet been published. Existing literature provides clues as to what might shape 
respondent evaluations, but due to lacking data no statistic evaluation has been performed. In 
order to seal this gaping hole in knowledge the paper seeks to address two main research 
questions. Firstly, a descriptive question; what is the rate of support for the Chinese model in 
Africa? Secondary and following, an explanatory question; what factors determines this 
support?  
2.2 Research design  
The paper proposes a relatively simple but efficient research design. To provide background 
the paper will first outline, through the use of descriptive statistics, respondents attitudes 
towards the Chinese model in Africa. Because no consensus exists around the tonality of 
sentiments towards to Chinese engagement the paper will offer a presentation of the China 
related questions included in Afrobarometer round six. After establishing what African 
perceptions of China are, a multivariate regression model will be constructed in order to seek 
out explanations for these attitudes. This model is shaped as an exploratory analysis where the 
variables are included in a block-by-block setting that shows the effect of one block while 
controlling for the previously entered variables. The use of multilevel modeling (MLM) 
allows for an exploration of variations among both individuals and individuals within 
countries.  
2.3 Levels of Analysis  
 
The paper employs two levels of analysis. First, an individual level where respondents are 
treated as independent of any higher level order. Second, a model where individual 
respondents are nested within countries. A two-level model is needed as we want to test 
whether respondents within countries are more similar to each other than respondents between 
countries. In this sense respondents are nested within countries that have characteristics that 
shape their responses to the survey questions. Their residuals are correlated - they are not 
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independent as would be assumed by standard logistic regression. The multilevel approach 
allows us to explore between country variations and in country variations.  
 
2.4 Cases or Units  
The analysis covers 31 African countries. Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This comprehensive 
sample offers a wide range not only in terms of geographical spread, but also by country 
characteristics such as regime type, demographics and development level.  
46741 individual respondents have been recorded by the Afrobarometer across these 
countries. Multi-country weighting is employed to balance out the difference in sampling. 
(This leads to n=37197 when analysis is run.)   
2.5 Descriptive section  
As noted in chapter one there is no consensus on the tonality of public opinion in Africa 
towards China. The purpose of the descriptive section is to support the main explanatory 
analysis (chapter four) by outlining just how popular the Chinese model is in Africa. In 
addition it will provide an overview over findings from the China related questions in 
Afrobarometer round six. It will outline summary statistics and analysis of missing values for 
these questions. A summary of these questions is included because they are intimately linked 
to choice of development model (this will be demonstrated by the multilevel regression model 
in chapter four).  
The key topic of chapter three is the overall tonality of African sentiments towards China in 












H1: Empirical. Previous surveys: Africans are on average positive towards the Chinese 
intervention on the continent.  
H2: Theoretical. Chinese soft power is capped because of authoritarian rule: Africans 
are on average negative towards to the Chinese intervention.  
 
2.6 Explanatory section 
The explanatory analysis seeks to root out what it is that determines respondents’ choice of 
development model. The examination employs two levels of analysis; individual and country. 
As the paper is the first to explore this topic empirically, the model is structured like an 
exploratory analysis. Variables are selected to fit blocks that match themes within the 
literature. These themes are theories of what shapes respondents views of China. They are; 
priorities for development, values (on democracy, authoritarianism and human rights), 
evaluations of China, country characteristics and ‘Chinese footprint’. The blocks are entered 
in to the model one block at a time to test for their effect while controlling for the effect of 
previous blocks. At national level (macro) the previous macro blocks are removed due to 
limitation of statistical power. All of these components have their respectful hypotheses. They 
are measured by the data and are finally tested in the model. Several alternative model designs 
could be explored with the same set of data, but as the paper sets out as the first of its kind the 
one-by-one exploration seems the most natural to the author.  
The model contains six levels. First, I employ two control variables, education and 
experienced poverty. They are included in the model because I want to explore people’s 
evaluations while controlling for the two factors. Choice of development model is a complex 
thing. In order to choose a role model you must have a certain level of understanding of both 
what is occurring in your own country, but also know something about key actors and states 
in international relations. Poverty is highly correlated with education level, but the two 
constructs are not the same. Poverty can limit people’s access to information and it is 
therefore important that the model controls for this variable.  
Second, as demonstrated in the literature review section one of the key characteristics of the 
China model is its focus on economic growth and infrastructure building. This contrary to the 
Western focus on good governance. The paper seeks to address this topic by measuring 
whether respondents who prioritize economic growth are more likely to choose the Chinese 
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model for development. Likewise, the model measures whether individuals who consider 
governance a key priority are less likely to choose the China model.  
Third, as highlighted by Andrew Nathan China represents an alternative to the democratic 
development model and the country is a role model for authoritarian growth. Can we find 
differences between respondents who express support for democracy and those who embrace 
authoritarian rule? Previous research has investigated the relationship between political and 
moral values and their impact on perceptions about Chinese involvement.99 Furthermore, the 
notion that democratic values and attitudes towards human rights makes Africans less positive 
to China has frequently been presented by Western media.100 Data from the Afrobarometer 
allows us to probe whether there is a connection between values and likelihood to choose the 
China model. Nye frequently stresses the importance of values for a country’s 
attractiveness.101 The survey contains questions on democracy, autocracy and human rights 
that offer a unique opportunity to probe whether respondent values determine their 
evaluations of the Chinese model. The sixth round of the survey does not ask questions 
directly related to China and human rights and democracy, but several questions serve as 
measures of their attitudes towards these issues in general. 
The forth block tests the importance of evaluations of China’s actions in the respondents’ own 
country. Are Africans who view China’s actions within their own country in a positive light 
more likely to choose the Chinese model? Respondents who consider the Chinese engagement 
to be helping their country could be more prone to adopt the China-model. An important 
component of this block of variables is evaluations of China’s power. This stems from the 
debate around the rise of China as a world power and the importance of strength in 
international relations. Stephen Halper links the rise of Beijing Consensus and Chinese soft 
power to the rise of China’s economic and military power.102 The different forms of power are 
intertwined. Evaluations (a soft power entity) are shaped by the growth of hard power 













would have us believe that accumulating power is the most important attribute for securing 
your states survival and prosperity.103 I propose that evaluations of power will shape Africans 
likelihood for choosing the Chinese model as respondents would want to choose a model for 
country development that strengthens their nation. A fruitful approach for this analysis to 
take, therefore, is to investigate the linkage between evaluations of Chinese power and 
preference for the Chinese model. Are respondents who view China to be more powerful 
more likely to choose the Chinese model of development? If respondents consider China to 
have a lot of impact and influence in their country, are they then more likely to choose the 
China-model? 
Block five moves on to national level variables. On the national level I test whether country 
characteristics make respondents nested within countries more likely to choose the Chinese 
model. First, I investigate whether living under authoritarian rule makes respondents more 
likely to prefer the Chinese model. In this section I want to evaluate whether individuals 
nested within authoritarian societies are more likely to choose the Chinese model for 
development. Second, I test whether respondents are shaped by their countries level of 
development. China is itself a developing country and is seen as a role model for developing 
states. As countries get richer and more developed there is reason to believe that China will 
not have the same level of attraction as a role model and that respondents would look to other 
countries as model for development.  
The last block includes a composite measure of ‘Chinese foot print’ in individual African 
nations. Does the level of interaction with the Chinese in everyday life make Africans more 
likely to choose the China-model as they have been exposed to the Chinese way of life and 
business? The block contains a proxy measure of the Chinese ‘footprint’ in individual African 
countries; FDI, aid and imports. It creates a palpable measure for how much exposure African 
states have to China, and thereby also an expected average exposure to individual 
respondents. It is assumed that if the country as whole has more interaction with China 
respondents in that country are on average more likely to experience interaction with the 
Chinese. This is not the same as direct interaction; there is no measure of how often people 






order to have a measure of person-to-person interactions. However, at present no reliable data 
is available.104  
2.7 Hypotheses  
The paper puts forward the broad categories mentioned above and tests them in six main 
groups of hypotheses and a number of sub-hypotheses within the respective categories. (Main 
factors in driving preference for the 'China-model'). The paper will control these variables 
against the null-hypothesis. The model is structured so that the first blocks are controlled for 
at later stages. This implies that when I get to hypothesis six (country characteristics) I am 
testing the effect while controlling for all the variables above.  
H0: None of the selected variables yield a statistically significant impact to the dependent 
variable.  
Micro - Individual level 
 
H.1. Control variables. Level of education and poverty alter the respondents’ likelihood of 
choosing the China-model of development.  
 
H.2.1 Economic growth. Respondents who value economic growth and infrastructure 
construction are more likely to choose the Chinese model of development  
H.2.2 Governance. Respondents who value governance are less likely to choose the Chinese-
model of development 
H.3. Personal values on human rights and democracy shape African perceptions of the 
China model   
H.4. Evaluations of China. Evaluations of China's power, influence and impact in the 










Macro - National level 
Chinese footprint 
H.5.1. FDI. The amount of foreign direct investment per capita from China shape African 
likelihood of choosing the China-model  
H.5.2 Aid. The amount of aid given per capita by China shape African perceptions about the 
Chinese model.  
H.5.3 Chinese imports. The amount of import from China per capita shape African 
perceptions of the China model 
Country characteristics  
H.6.1 Level of development. The higher the level of country development the less likelihood 
that respondents choose the Chinese-model of development  
H.6.2 Authoritarian rule. Respondents who live in authoritarian societies are more likely to 
hold preference for the Chinese-model of development 
The Argument 
The paper makes an explicit goal of not selecting a favorite among the hypotheses chosen. 
Rather it aims to explore potential reasons why respondents might chose the China model 
over other models for development. The main aim is to empirically evaluate what perceptions 
are and seek to uncover their main drivers. All the chosen explanatory variables stem from the 
current literature and have frequently been presented as potential sources of attraction to the 
Chinese way. The current debate largely lacks an “African voice” and is all too often based on 
speculation rather than solid data. A key premise therefore is to not have the answer before 






















2.9 Data and measurement 
 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable comes from the Afrobarometer. Question 80A asks; "In your opinion, 
which of the following countries, if any, would be the best model for the future development of 
our country?” The respondents are read a list of five options. The United States, China, 
Former Colonial Power (varies in between countries), India or South Africa. They can also 
reply “none of these” and record a verbatim answer that is later coded by the surveyor. A 
table of all recorded responses and their frequencies has been included in the appendix (1.0).  
The dependent variable has been given some treatment in order for it to provide analytical 
clarity. It has been recorded as a dichotomous categorical variable, a dummy variable; 'China 
vs other'. This implies that during the analysis I will be looking at why people choose the 
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Chinese model compared to all other models included in the survey. The binary coding 
enables us to run a multilevel logistic model for categorical outcomes. 'China vs other'. The 
purpose of the paper is to explore why Africans choose the Chinese model over all other 
models; respondents who answered that they do not know or refused to answer have therefore 
been dropped from this analysis. Respondents who were unable to identify a model for 
development cannot help us explain why Africans choose China over other models.  
 
Most of the respondents were able to name a country they consider as role model for their 
states development. Among the 9.1 percent who did not we find significant and high 
correlation with lacking education (-.183, p<.001) and significant correlation with 
experienced poverty (.39, p<.001). See section 2.12 for conceptual discussion of what is 
meant by ‘model’.  
Explanatory variables 
As mentioned the multilevel logistic regression model employs two levels, macro and micro, 
with serval blocks on both levels. At individual level (micro) the model enters variables 
according to the four following blocks: 1) Control variables 2) Priorities for development 3) 
Attitudes and values towards democracy and authoritarianism 4) Views on China's 
engagement in the respondent’s country. The macro-level is national level data and it 
encompasses measurements of foreign direct investment, aid, trade, the Freedom House Index 
and the Human Development Index. 
Individual level data - Afrobarometer  
All data at micro level (individual) data used for this paper comes from round six of the 
Afrobarometer survey series. The dataset used for this paper is an early access set of relevant 
variables for the first thirty two available countries. It was provided under a written agreement 
with Afrobarometer. The data has not yet been publicly released and the author would like to 
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point out that there may be minor differences to later released data. Swaziland was dropped 
from the sample as respondents in that country were not asked questions on China.  
 
Afrobarometer is an African-led, non-partisan research project that has measured countries’ 
social, political, and economic atmosphere since 1999. In its sixth survey round (2014-15), it 
is covering 35 countries. Afrobarometer is funded by the UK Department of International 
Development (DFID), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and World 
Bank. 
"Afrobarometer uses national probability samples designed to meet the criteria of a 
representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give 
every adult citizen an equal and known chance of being selected for an interview. This is 
achieved via using random selection methods at every stage of sampling and sampling at all 
stages with probability proportionate to population size (PPPS) wherever possible to ensure 
that larger (i.e., more populated) geographic units have a proportionally greater probability of 
being chosen into the sample.  
Samples usually include either 1200 or 2400 cases (2400 for South Africa).  With a sample 
size of n=2400, the margin of error is +/-2.0% at 95 percent confidence level."105  
 
Control variables  
 
The study will include two control variables in the regression model. These variables measure 
the respondent’s level of education and a scale of experienced poverty.  The variables are 
interesting in and of themselves and not only included to act as control variables. Education 
was chosen because it allows us to control for the effects of schooling on respondents 
evaluations of the Chinese engagement. Poverty was selected because it is assumed that 
respondents who live in poverty are less likely to have opinions about international 
cooperation and models for development as poor conditions deprive them of the information 








Education is measured through a self-report question in the Afrobarometer. It is assumed that 
respondents offer an honest reply when they are asked: “What is your highest level of 
education?”106 
The Afrobarometer contains five questions that ask respondents 
how often they have gone without food, water, medical care, 
cooking fuel or cash income. These five questions arguably 
represent a scale for experienced poverty. Respondents who 
score higher on the questions live lives of less material 
wellbeing. A factor analysis was explored after the data was 
found to be in a suitable format. The scale was subjected to 
maximum likelihood analysis and direct oblim rotation using 
SPSS. The analysis yielded a Keiser Mayer Olkin value of .832 
and the Bartlett's test came out as statistically significant 
(p<.001). 
One factor with an eigenvalue of more than one was extracted. This factor explained 44.653 
percent of variance. Reliability analysis revealed a Cronbach's Alpha of .797 and no increase 
if any of the items were dropped. The table shows the factor loadings.  
Priorities for development  
Block two of the model contains two variables that have been constructed from question 60 of 
the Afrobarometer. It asks respondents what the most important problems are facing their 
country that government should address. The surveyor then records up to three verbatim 
responses and codes them accordingly. The Gov and Econinfra variables are categorical 
measures of whether the respondents mentioned a topic related to governance or economics 













the respondent mentioned several topics within the same category. As respondents are asked 
to list priorities but not order them, it is assumed that respondents make no distinction in level 
of priority for listing one versus listing three. 107 
Value questions  
The survey contains a number of questions that measure people’s values on democracy. The 
paper will not utilize the direct question on democracy as it is assumed that people answer it 
with a simple heuristic of “democracy is good” rather than an evaluation of system of rule. 
The indirect questions included in the survey are therefore used instead. 
The survey askes respondent three questions that together form 
a scale of authoritarian rejection. Respondents are asked if 
they approve or disapprove of one-party rule, army rule or one 
man rule on a five point scale. A factor analysis was run using 
SPSS. After the questions were subjected to maximum 
likelihood analysis and direct oblim rotation the scale yielded a 
Kaiser Mayer Olkin value of .636 and a Bartlett's test that was 
significant (p<.001). One factor with an eigenvalue above one 
was extracted. The factor explained 38,561% of variance. The 
factor has a Cronbach's Alpha score of .631 during reliability tests and no increase will occur 
if any of the items are dropped from the scale.108 
In addition to the scale on authoritarian rejection three more variables have been included in 
the value section of the model. Q31 and Q32 asks respondents to evaluate two statements and 
choose the one that is closest to their view. They can either agree or partly agree with the 
statement. They can also decline to offer an answer; in which case they are dropped from the 
sample. Q31 asks respondents whether they find that it is more important to have a 
government that gets things done or that the government is accountable to its citizens. Q32 











arguably reveal values on democracy held by the people answering the survey. Q77 probes 
values on human rights versus sovereignty and asks respondents to choose between 
statements that take opposite views on intervention in the name of human rights. 109 
Views on China’s engagement in the respondent’s country  
The forth block contains variables measuring the respondents evaluation of China’s 
engagement in their country. Q81A asks the person surveyed to rate the amount of economic 
influence that China has in his or her country on a four point scale (none to a lot). Q81B and 
Q81E arguably represent a scale for evaluations of China’s 
economic and political impact in the respondent’s country. 
Both questions ask the person surveyed to rate on a five-point 
scale whether he or she finds China to have a positive or 
negative impact. The variable ‘China Scale’ was computed by combining these two variables. 
Since we only have two items factor analysis will not yield a valid outcome. The reliability 
test gives us a Cronbach Alpha of .643.110 
 
The country influence variable is a 
categorical coding of Afrobarometer’s 
Q80B. The question asks respondents 






















in their country. It differs from Q81A in that it is more comprehensive and grasps both a 
political and economic dimension.  The variable has been coded as China vs other.  
 
Respondents who choose China make up 23.4 percent (27 percent among people who offer a 
reply) of the total.  (See chapter three for discussion on make-up of answers.) Missing value 
analysis reveals that respondents level of eduacation is highly correlated with a non-reply (-
.184, p<.001). Expericenced poverty makes respondents less likely to offer an answer to the 
question (.04, p<.001). 111 
 
Macro: National level    
 
Country characteristics  
 
The country characteristics block is made up of two separate components. The first is a 
measure of development level. This variable allows for an investigation of whether a 
countries level of development will change the likelihood of respondents seeing China as role 
model for development. The second variable is a measure of regime type. As China is 
presented as the authoritarian development alternative the model should investigate the link 
between regime type and choice of development model. 
 
Human Development Index  
The paper utilizes the Human Development Index as a measure of a countries level of 
development. Compared to a univariate GDP measure the HDI measure offers additional 
factors of development that would have been missed if the paper simply employed a one-
dimensional approach to development. The HDI is a composite of income per capita, 
educational level and life expectancy. All data is drawn from the 2013 report.112  
Freedom House Ranking  
In order to evaluate whether living in an authoritarian state influences the likelihood of 








the World report and data to measure the level of civil liberties and political rights in Africa. 
Freedom House employs expert panel surveys and “findings are researched after a 
multilayered process of analysis and evaluation by a team of in-house and consultant regional 
experts and scholars.” The variable used in our model is the average of the civil liberties and 
political rights measures provided by Freedom House' 2013 report. 113 
Chinese “footprint” 
 
The last block contains three variables that together make up an aggregate Chinese footprint 
in the countries surveyed. It seeks to investigate whether the total level of imports, foreign 
direct investment and aid alter respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model.  
 
AidData 
Chinese aid to Africa is the opposite of transparent. Contrary to traditional donors China 
regards aid to Africa as a state secret and will not release individual country data on 
development assistance. Furthermore, the Chinese government will not disclose its definition 
of aid and considerable amounts could therefore fly under the radar. In order to overcome 
these challenges AidData, based at the College of William and Marry, has recently developed 
a set of open source data collection methods to track project-level Chinese development 
finance to Africa. The data is collected using media reports and tracks Chinese aid to Africa 
down to the level of the specific project. Importantly the dataset also contains a precise 
geographical location.   
Aid Data uses the so-called Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF), a new 
methodology, which leverages open-source information on development finance by non-
transparent, non-Western donors. It utilizes open source data such as news reports, 
government documents and scholarly publications to work its way around secrecy and 









The paper utilizes the 1.1 dataset that tracks Chinese development finance in Africa from 
2000-2011.All projects listed under official finance are summarized to measure the total 
amount of aid during the period to individual countries. The data has been calculated in per 
capita terms to offset for country size. In order to counter the biases of outliers the numbers 
have been log-transformed.  
FDI   
Measuring Chinese foreign direct investment has also proven to be notoriously difficult. The 
African Development Bank has noted problems with measuring Chinese FDI to Africa as 
large portions of investment is channeled through Hong Kong and other intermediates.115 The 
Economist Research Unit and Deborah Brautigam (a leading China-Africa scholar) have 
utilized and recommended a database compiled by Dereck Scissors at the American 
Enterprise Institute (AEI).116 The China Global Investment Tracker works its way around the 
problem of intermediates and secrecy by using open sources such as corporate reporting, 
government reports and news outlets. These open sources discuss final destination of the 
investment and thereby avoid the problem of intermediate destination. The use of data from 
the tracker comes with a number of reservations in mind. Firstly, the tracker only records 
projects of $100 million or above. Secondly, and critically, the methodology for how the 
Enterprise Institute collects and codifies data has yet to be published in a publically available 
methodology paper. The author upon emailing Dereck Scissors was informed that no such 
paper exists. However, Scissors indicated that the institute will answer any questions 
regarding methodology.117 After some clarifying questions on the method employed for 
collecting and vetting the data and considering that it has been recommended and employed 
by leading scholars in the field the author has decided to employ the data in the analysis.  
The data used for the analysis is the sum of FDI from the beginning of the database 2005 until 












Data on Chinese trade with Africa are drawn UN Comtrade.119 The data used to compute the 
trade variable is total imports from China from 2005 to 2013. In order to control for 
differences in country size the trade data has been recorded in per capita terms. Furthermore, 
to avoid having outliers dominate our results the trade variable has been logged so to create a 
normal distribution.  
Per capita measures  
All trade, aid and investment data have been calculated in per capita terms to control for 
variations in country size. 2013 demographic data has been used as base year. Population data 
was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.120 
Other data used: PEW  
Data from PEW’s Spring 2015 Global Attitudes Survey has been used as a reference point 
throughout this paper and its data severs as basis of some of its figures. The survey data has 
not been included in the regression model, but functions as a valuable reference point for the 
descriptive discussions on perceptions of the Chinese.121 
 
2.11 Definitions, delineations and limitations  
 
In order to enable a discussion around a social phenomenon as large as the one described 
under the label “China in Africa” the paper needs to make employ some simplifying 
terminology and constructs for analysis. These simplifications do not, however, come without 
reservations or reflections. The author recognizes that the process known as “China in Africa” 
is the product of an unfathomable amount of choices made at the individual level. While the 
process is complex the resolution of the data allows for analysis of grand trends while 












Africa is often treated as singular unit rather than a diverse set of fifty-four countries with 
varying degrees of Chinese involvement.  Chris Alden eloquently illustrates that it is 
problematic to oversimplify the picture and solely talk about one unified African continent 
when we are in fact dealing with fifty four different countries with a varying culture, 
language, geography, resources and various forms of political organization.122 Most authors 
on the field fail to mention that China has bilateral relations with individual African countries 
and multilateral relations to the African continent. The paper still utilizes the concept of 
“Africa” as it is not without analytical meaning. James Ferguson has argued that the label is 
not without utility. He points to the fact that anthropologist and others who denounce the use 
of the term ”Africa” have put themselves on the sidelines and become bystanders to the 
broader discussions about the continents position in the world. The term “Africa” is 
meaningful as long at as it is used by Africans themselves and the fact that it features 
prominently in the literature makes it a very real entity when evaluating the broader themes of 
global economics and politics.123 The use of disaggregated data collected from thirty one 
individual African country’s aids in seeing the diversity between African nations, and identify 
broader trends where they exist. While African continent is immensely diverse, it is still 
possible to identify tendencies across national boundaries when it comes to perceptions of 
Chinese involvement.  
 
"China" 
‘China’ is much more of a monolithic entity then ‘Africa’, but the Chinese intervention on the 
African continent is not driven by one actor. The Chinese involvement in Africa is often 
presented as homogenous and driven forwards by a unison player with a clear and determined 
strategy for its involvement. This perception fails to appreciate the complexity of Chinese 
political and economic structures. Few authors emphasize the diversity of Chinese 
engagement. Nor do they point out that much of the movement is driven by individuals, rather 






Africa. They have established an official forum for Sino-African relations and they do, 
through their diplomacy, actively work to implement their strategy on the continent. 124 
However, despite the massive efforts of the Chinese state apparatus, and its comparatively 
much firmer grip on most parts of society and the economy than most Western governments, 
it is a far leap to claiming that China is speaking with only one voice in Africa.  
One of the growing trends in the relationship is the ever increasing importance of private 
Chinese enterprises. Alden and other scholars like him have argued that these enterprises must 
be seen as different from that of the state.125 Chinese involvement on the African continent is 
driven by a multitude of actors and just because they have passports from the same state does 
not imply that they have the same motivations and ambition. Private individuals, settlers, 
business men and women, small and medium size companies as well as the larger state-owned 
corporations play an important role in the development of relations. Zhang Chun points out 
that the evolution of the Sino-Africa relationship shows a “trend of diversification of actors 
and interests.” Besides  from official state actors like the Ministry of Commerce, the Foreign 
Ministry and other central governmental ministries and agencies,  a large variety of other 
actors like “state-owned companies, provincial agencies, province-owned companies, private 
companies and even individuals have a role”.126 According to Vice Minister Wang Chao state 
owned companies do not dominate China’s investment in Africa. Rather, it is small and 
medium sized businesses that make up more than 85 percent of the 2000 Chinese companies 
that operate in Africa.127 The discourse in Western media and academic journals frequently 
paints a black or white picture of the Chinese involvement in Africa as either “partner” or 
“exploiter”.128 Reality is much more nuanced.  
Despite these important reservations; in the realm of soft power the idea of China as a 
construct still matters. Respondents identify China as an entity and label Chines-actors under 
that singular umbrella. While reality might be more nuanced, evaluations are made of these 
















The Afrobarometer asks its respondents; “In your opinion, which of the following countries, if 
any, would be the best model for the future development of our country?” It is important to 
emphasize that this wording gives us certain limitations. Firstly, we cannot assume that 
individuals who respond to the survey read this question in any particular way. Interpretations 
of ‘model’ may vary from respondent to respondent. The “Beijing Consensus” sees the 
Chinese model of development as an alternative approach to development with strong state 
intervention leading the way. This is in direct competition with to the “Washington 
Consensus” and its neo-liberal approach. While the paper recognizes that a number of the 
respondents might be thinking along those lines, the question does not provide enough 
information in order to make strong conclusions on the matter. It might be that some of the 
respondents are in favor of only some of the components of outlined by Ramo or that they 
may interpret the Chinese model completely differently. The paper will therefore not equate 
support for the Chinese model of development to support for the Beijing Concuss. We can’t 
assume that this implies support for the Beijing Consensus, nor that it entails complete 
support for all aspects of Chinese development. For example very unlikely that people have 
detailed knowledge of China’s development. Even if they do, they are unlikely to believe their 
country should blindly copy all aspects of China’s development. Anyone who has read Frank 
Doikotte’s book on Mao’s Great Famine during the ‘Great leap forward’ campaign would 
know that there are have been grave mistakes in China’s path to development.129 In the 
implications chapter (6) I will return to a thorough discussion of what this implies and how 
we can read the results.  
But while respondent are unlikely to have detailed knowledge about what the China model 
entails it is fair to assume that they know a fair amount about China in Africa. Paper does not 
depend on respondents having detailed knowledge. 
"Aid"  
As pointed out by the aforementioned AidData Working Paper it is tricky to distinguish 
between Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its more commercially-





willingness to mix business with development assistance make categorical distinctions 
difficult. Chinese aid is not aid in the strict OECD definition and the country’s model for 
development is based on ideas of helping through mutual gains. As Deborah Brautigam has 
pointed out “foreign aid, investment, and trade are not really distinct categories” for China. 
They are politically bound together under a set of intricate financial arrangements.130 The 
majority of China’s officially supported finance is according to Brautigam not actually ODA, 
but other financial flows.131 The AidData project works its way around this problem by using 
open source data to track active projects. Its database distinguishes between official finance 
and other financial flows.132 The FDI data from American Enterprise Institute tracks 
investment from source to destination. While this does not guarantee overlap between projects 
and financial flows it is fair to assume that they are distinct categories and that they can be 
measured with relative accuracy.  
Limitations 
Due to limitation and requirements for relative brevity the author has had to make some 
though choices with regards to the depth of analysis. The paper is unable to offer a breakdown 
and analysis according to stratified social subgroups. Exploring the difference between people 
in different occupations and with different belonging to parties within individual countries 
would likely unlock explanations for Chinese support in some countries.  Furthermore, the 
author would greatly have enjoyed including analysis of the effects of migration, media use 
and media framing. However, these data are simply not available at the time of writing.   
It is important to highlight that the paper does not rely on people to put any particular content 
to the notion of a China model. Rather it seeks to explore the covariation between the selected 
variables to see if there are patterns in the type of respondents who tend to choose the China 
model. Regardless of what content people interpret into the Chinese way of development it 












2.12 Method of Control 
Criteria of acceptance and rejection 
The criteria of acceptance of the model is, as according to Carl Popper’s Conjectures and 
Refutations, that we can reject the null hypothesis and detect a relationship that is statistically 
shown not to happen by chance itself. This does not imply final proof, just that the null 
hypothesis is unlikely.133 As mentioned earlier; the direction of the relationship is not the central 
them. The output of the regression model will show which of the hypotheses comes closest to 
representing reality. If the regression model shows that we can significantly predict the 
dependent variable, choice of development model, from our key independent variables then the 























What do Africans think about China?  
The purpose of the descriptive section is to outline just how popular the Chinese model is in 
Africa as well as to provide an overview over findings from the other China related questions 
in the survey. Seeing that the literature is so polarized in its presentation of African public 
opinion on China it is necessary to outline the findings of the Afrobarometer survey. The sixth 
round provides the most comprehensive sampling and coverage of China-related-questions 
currently available. Chapter three will serve as a summary of African sentiments towards 
China.  As described in chapter two, two main hypotheses have been advanced by the 
literature:  
H1: Empirical. Based on previous surveys: Africans are on average positive towards the 
Chinese intervention on the continent.  
H2: Theoretical. Chinese soft power is capped because of authoritarian rule: Africans 
are on average negative towards to the Chinese intervention.  
This chapter finds that contrary to the alarmist reports from various media sources Africans 
are on average very positive to the Chinese involvement on the continent. They view the 
political and economic impact as positive and consider Chinese aid to be of assistance in 
developing their country.  
 
3.1 China is perceived to be a positive 
influence  
The data from Afrobarometer supports the notion 
that China is well perceived in African countries. 
63.9 percent of respondents rate China’s 
influence in their country as somewhat or very 
positive when it comes to politics and economics 
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(74 percent if we only count those who offered a response.)134  These positive sentiments hold 
true for a number of stratified categories. Evaluations of China are not correlated with 
education or the occupation of the respondents. Neither is there a relationship between living 
in an authoritarian society and evaluations of the Chinese. However, respondents from more 
developed countries (measured by HDI) are more likely to give less favorable evaluations of 
the Chinese engagement (-.167, p<.001).  
Although the majority of respondents could offer an opinion a large proportion (13.6 percent) 
of Africans interviewed did not offer answers to the question. Analysis of the missing group 
reveals that a non-reply is correlated with poverty (.07, p<.001) and highly correlated with 
level of education (-.213, p<.001). Put differently, respondents who are poor and who have 
low levels of education are more likely to say that they have not heard enough to say, or that 
they do not know.  
Positive evaluations of Chinese development assistance are also found in the Afrobarometer 
data. Q81E of the survey asks respondents to evaluate the impact of Chinese aid on a five-
point scale.135  A majority of respondents, 57.1 percent, find that China does somewhat of a 
good job or a very good job at meeting their countries development needs. While western 
discourse might paint Chinese development assistance as “rouge aid”136, Africans value its 
















3.2 Economic factors identified as key  
The survey asks respondents two questions, Q81C and D, 
on what they think contributes to positive and negative 
evaluations of China. African evaluations of the Chinese 
seem mostly not to be driven by political factors. When 
asked what contributes to positive evaluations respondents 
list two main categories. Economic factors such as 
infrastructure construction and business investment, and 
the quality or cost of Chinese products. The investments 
made in infrastructure construction and business 
investment make up nearly half of all respondent replies 
with 48 percent. The cost or quality of Chinese products is 
also listed as a key explanation with 23.3 percent. Political 
factors are only mentioned by slightly more than 10 
percent of respondents and cultural factors are a mere 
curiosity with less than a percent of respondents 
identifying an appreciation of Chinese people, culture and 
language. 137 
When it comes to negative sentiments, the poor quality of 
Chinese products stands out with 35.7 percent. This may 
seem counterintuitive considering that a large amount of 
respondents identified Chinese products as a driver of 
positive sentiment, but the wording of these questions 
hides a distinction in price versus quality. For many 
respondent negative sentiments are related to quality while 
it can be assumed that positive sentiments are driven by 
price. In fact the two Chinese product related answers are 
correlated (.157, p<.000) indicating that many respondents 








negative.  The other most prevalent answers were that the Chinese are stealing jobs (14.6 
percent), extraction of natural resources (10.4 percent) and land grabbing (7.5 percent). The 
behaviour of Chinese citizens was also identified as a driver of negative sentiments, but only 
by 6 percent of respondents. Following, economic variables form African perceptions of the 
Chinese engagement. Economic impact dominates the narrative around China’s engagement 
in the respondent’s country. Political influences seemingly play a secondary role along with 
cultural values or norms. 138 
3.3 China is seen as influential  
The Afrobarometer survey contains two questions that 
ask respondents to evaluate the level of Chinese 
influence in their country. Q80b asks respondents to 
gauge what country has the most influence in their 
state.139 23.1 percent of respondents point to China 
(26.6 percent if we only look at respondents who named 
a country). This puts The Middle Kingdom on par with 
the United States and the former colonial powers.* The 
former colonial power category is a collective term and 
in the questionnaire the respective former colonial 
power is inserted. This implies that China is identified 
as the single most important country right ahead of the 
US. While the country average is high, the span is great. 
From only 1.9 percent of respondents in Tunisia to 62.3 
percent of respondents in Zimbabwe, who identify 
China as the most influential country, there is a range of 60.4 points. However, if central 
tendency is measured by median the number remains high (27.1 percent). A complete list of 












Question 81A asks respondents to rate how much influence 
China has on their country’s economy. 42.7 percent of 
Africans find that China has a lot of influence on their 
countries economy. While 27.8 percent finds that China has 
some influence.140 It is thereby fair to conclude that China is 
perceived as highly influential in Africa by the respondents.  
3.4 The Chinese model is popular  
In this sample of thirty one African countries, an average of 
26.7 percent of respondents say that they prefer the Chinese 
development model. As we can see from the table below there 
are, however, significant variations in between countries. In 
Cameroon more than half of all respondents who answered the 
question replied that they preferred the Chinese model 
compared to all others. In Ghana only 17.9 percent of 
respondents said the same. This large between country 
variation indicates the relevance of the multilevel model and 
highlights that there are variations to explore between countries 
and not just between individuals.  What we can establish from 
just the descriptive data is that China offers a very popular 
model for development. For respondents in the thirty one 
countries only the United States is on average more popular 
with 31.2 percent of respondents saying that they would chose 
the US as model for development. In a third of the countries 
China is a more popular choice than the United States. The former colonial powers come in at 
a distant third place with 13.8 percent on average. Interestingly only about one in ten 
respondents identified a fellow African country. 10.3 percent of respondents identify South 
Africa as their preferred development model. A breakdown of respondents’ choice has been 










Most respondents have named a country they find to be a model for country development. 
Only 9 percent of the respondents refuse to offer an answer or say that they don’t know. The 
missing category is correlated with poverty (.04, p<.001) and low levels of education (-.185, 
p<.001). 
3.5 One big “China-construct”?  
Arguably the questions on China could make one scale or measurement of “affect towards 
China.” Were this to be true the later regression model would have components of the same 
construct on both sides of the equation and be invalid. However, this is analytically and 
statistically incorrect.  
The questions used for the regression model measure different analytic constructs. The 
dependent variable measures preference for China as a development model. Question 81B and 
81E probes whether respondents find that China is helping their country and if they consider 




influence. This is different from evaluation of whether it is positive or negative. Importantly, 
there is also a distinction between the two influence questions. One probes the total level of 
influence were as the other deals specifically with economic influence. Bivariate correlations 
between the two is only .116 (p<.000). This holds true even when a binary recode has been 
done so we can compare those who consider China to have a lot of economic impact to those 
who see China as the overall most important country. 141 
That respondents consider these questions as probing different themes and constructs is 
supported by the variations in the Afrobarometer data. None of the China related questions are 
correlated at levels that would indicate that they are measuring the same underlying construct. 
The single largest correlation occurs between choice of development model and choice of 
country with most influence (.320, p<.000). This implies that the two items are closely tied 
together, respondents who choose China for development model are more likely to choose 
China as the most influential country, but they are different constructs and recognized as such 
by respondents. When reliability analysis is run it only yields a mediocre Cronbach Alpha of 
.485. The paper therefore considers the questions on China to be measuring different things 
and judging by the statistics so do respondents. The two questions that do measure the same 








3.6 Chapter conclusion  
The analysis of data from Afrobarometer round six reveals that most Africans perceive China 
in a positive light when it comes to economic, political and development assistance impact. 
Furthermore, most Africans see China as having considerable influence on their country. 
These sentiments provide an important background for the discussion on why Africans choose 
the Chinese model for development. As chapter four will demonstrate that respondent 
evaluations of Chinese impact in their own country is intimately linked to their choice of 
development model. This form of analysis is important as the data reveals that the Chinese 
development model is a very popular choice in the surveyed countries. Overall in our sample 
it is comparatively popular to the United States. In ten out of the thirty one countries it is the 




















Chapter three has established that Africans evaluate China in a positive light. Importantly 
Africans also view China as a viable model for their country’s development. When asked to 
choose model for their country’s development China is the second most popular after the 
United States. So what explains respondents’ choice of development model? The table below 
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outlines the models findings. The multilevel model was calculated using STATA 14 melogit 
function.  
4.1 Model findings  
 
The model is structured according to the blocks outlined in chapter two. The analysis is run by 
adding one and one block, or layer, to the prior variables included. This implies that the model 
controls for the effect of all previously entered variables. The national level data (micro) is 
added in separate blocks, removing previously entered national level variables. This is done 
for two reasons. Firstly, it is theoretically interesting to see the effect of the two national 
characteristics (FDI and Freedom House Scores) and Chinese footprint as separate entities. 
Second, limitations of statistical power apply to the national level data as the sample only 
includes thirty one countries to explore variations in between. The reason for adding all the 
footprint variables together is to explore combined effect of all these variables as they 
theoretically make up one construct.  
 
The table includes two measures of ‘model fit’; AIC and BIC. The Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) can be seen as relative measures 
of model quality comparing them to each other.  No consensus exists around exact 
interpretation of these two entities, but they both indicate better fit when values drop.  The 
table shows that all the blocks improve model fit. The ‘China-block’ contributes the strongest 
improvement when it is added to the regression.   
The model shows that some of the explanatory variables have a statistically significant impact 
on the dependent variable, meaning that the model helps explain why Africans choose China 
as a development model compared to other nations. We can therefore reject the stated null-
hypothesis.  
 
Education is a significant predictor for choice of the Chinese model. The more education a 
respondent has the more likely she is to choose the Chinese model. The effect however is 
limited, but the impact is significant for all versions of the model (.04 to .07, p<.000). 
Experienced poverty does not make a significant impact to the dependent variable except 
from in model 4 and 5. However, the effect size is almost non-existent. Poverty is therefore 
found not to be an important predictor for respondent’s choice of development model when 




Respondents’ priorities for development offer small difference in explaining the dependent 
variables. Both explanatory variables offer significant impact at several versions of the model 
and both show negative relationships with the dependent variable. This implies that 
individuals who consider governance a key priority are less likely to choose the China model. 
However, the hypothesized dichotomy between the two variables did not materialize. 
Respondents who prioritize economic growth are also less likely to Chinese model for 
development. This presents a bit of a puzzle. In model 2, were we only control for the effect 
of education and experienced poverty, priority of economic factors and infrastructure makes 
respondents less likely to choose the Chinese model (-.09, p<.01). Prioritizing governance 
yields a non-statistically significant impact in this model. Governance becomes important as 
we start controlling for the other variables (values, evaluations of China, country 
characteristics and Chinese footprint), but the effect size is small. Block two therefore offers 
little insight into what shapes choice of development model. Instead of the hypothesized 
dichotomy the finding lends support to the notion that respondents who are conscious about 
their preferences for how development should proceed shun away from China. The finding 
offers a puzzle for future research to explore.  
 
The block on values offers one of the papers greatest surprises. Values on democracy, 
authoritarianism and human rights do not explain respondents’ choice of China as model for 
development. Only the question on peoples influence over politics yields a statistically 
significant impact. However, it only does so for two versions of the model. In these versions it 
has a very small effect size (-.04, p<.001 and -.02, p<.01). The key finding, therefore, is that 
on the whole values are not an important determinant of Africa’s choice of development 
model.  
 
Evaluations of China’s engagement and influence the respondent’s country, block four, 
greatly shape the likelihood of choosing the Chinese model. Respondents who report positive 
evaluations of Chinese impact on politics, economics and aid are much more likely to choose 
China as their model for development (.41 to .44, p<.001). Africans who view China as 
influential are also more likely to pick them as role model. Respondents’ who think China has 
a lot of impact on their countries economy are more prone to choosing China (.05 to .06, 
p<.001). Those who consider China to have the most influence of all countries are much more 
likely to choose the Chinese model (1.65 to 1.76, p<.001). The forth hypothesis is therefore 
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supported by the model. Evaluations of China's power, influence and impact in the 
respondent's home country shape their likelihood of choosing the Chinese development 
model. 
 
Block five introduces national level variables. Respondents nested within well developed 
countries are much less likely to choose China as their 
development model. A country’s level of development 
is a significant predictor with substantial impact on 
choice of development model (-.92, p<.01). Regime 
type also matters. The model shows that a country’s 
level of authoritarianism also predicts respondent’s 
choice of model for development. Higher Freedom 
House scores are associated with less likelihood for 
choosing the China model for development (-.08, 
p<.001). This is a puzzle because the coding of 
Freedom House scores dictate that as countries get 
more authoritarian scores go up. In other words, the 
model shows that the more democratic and free a 
country is, the more likely it gets that its citizens 
choose China. The link between regime type and 
development level is an old favorite of social science 
literature and a second model was run to explore this 
relationship more in-depth. When the model is 
tweaked to run the two variables together to see the 
effect of each while controlling for the other, the 
effects only grow. While controlling for development 
level the adverse effect of Freedom House scores 
swells (-.31, p<.001) indicating that China has a 
stronger pull on respondents from democratic 
68 
 
countries, even when we control for development level. Development level meanwhile 
becomes ever more important (-3.59, p<.001), when we are controlling for regime type.142 
This puzzled will be explored in more detailed in section 4.2.  
The variables measuring Chinese footprint show that the more engagement China has in a 
country the less likely respondents are to choose the Chinese model for development. 
However, the variables included in the block are pulling in separate directions. Higher levels 
of import lead to more positive evaluation (.13, p<.01), however the effect size is somewhat 
limited. More aid and foreign direct investment lead to less likelihood of respondents 
choosing the Chinese model. These variables yield quite strong effect sizes. AID (-.25, 
p<.001) and FDI (-.21, p<.001). The “footprint block” arguably makes up two components. 
Increased imports from China do not necessary imply increased interaction between Africans 
and Chinese. Rather it means more of the cheap Chinese products which are favored by the 
African populous (as demonstrated in chapter three). Increased AID and FDI on the other 
hand implies actual interaction with Chinese through their projects. A higher rate of FDI and 
AID could therefore be a proxy for increased interaction between the Chinese and ordinary 
Africans. The present data cannot answer the question of whether the lower probability for 
choosing the China model is due to increased interaction or because the projects and 
investments themselves are unpopular. It therefore presents an opportunity for the design of 
future research.  
The outcome of the model yields several interesting insights and two large puzzles. Firstly 
why do values on democracy and human rights not determine choice of development model in 
Africa? After all this was found to be significant by previous research. Second, why does 
more liberal and democratic rule increase the likelihood of respondents choosing the Chinese 
model?  
4.2 On democratic understanding; China the democracy?  
 
One key reason for why authoritarian rejection and value questions such as human rights do 
not explain African preference for the China-model of development might lie in the fact that 
Africans on average do not view China as being an authoritarian country. To the contrary a 























Median percentage saying whether 
goverment of China respects the personal 
freedom of its people  
No Yes
Source: PEW 2015 Spring Attitudes Survey Q19a 
the Afrobarometer, which covered all of the countries included in the round six sample, 
reveals that a large proportion of respondents, 65.5 percent on average, rate China as six or 
above when asked to rate the level of democracy in China on a ten-point scale. At the time of 
the survey, 2013, China received a non-free ranking and the worst and second worst scores for 
political rights and civil liberties respectfully by Freedom House.143  
 
African evaluations of China’s human rights record are available from PEW’s Spring 2015 
survey. Of the nine African countries surveyed a median of 60 percent of respondents say 
China respects the personal freedoms of its people. This puts Africa in a league of its own as 
it is the only continent where a median of more than half the respondents give China a good 
human rights scorecard. Sadly the PEW sampling of African countries is not as 
comprehensive as the Afrobarometer, but in light of African evaluations of democracy in 
China it is fair to assume that Africans view China to be far less authoritarian than 
independent observer groups. 
 
This should not be interpreted as a 
lacking understanding of 
democracy or as a lack of demand 
for democratic rights. Previous 
research based on Afrobarometer 
data finds that democracy is a 
recognizable construct to most 
Africans interviewed. Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi find that 
support for democracy in Africa is 
widespread, if somewhat shallow.  
Furthermore, Africans tend to give 
positive descriptions about 
democracy when promoted to offer 







“Africans value democracy both as an end in itself and as a means to improve governance and 
welfare.”144  
 
In some respects African evaluations of Chinese democracy and its human rights record is a 
victory for Chinese soft power. Chinese official rhetoric blurs the picture and presents the 
country as democratic. Its representatives talk about the "Chinese democracy". Xi Jinping's 
outlines the Chinese Dream as the goal of building a “prosperous, strong, democratic, 
civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized country.” A firm goal that is to be realized by 
the People’s Republic of China’s centennial in 2049.145 The declaration from the sixth Forum 
on China-African cooperation expresses support for “advancing democracy.”146 It may very 
well be that Joseph Nye is right about his assumptions that China authoritarian rule should cap 
the country’s soft power at a threshold,147 but what Nye overlooks in this instance is that soft 
power is the result of perceptions, not hard realities. China may very well be autocratic in 
every objectively measurable way, but if the country is perceived to be democratic it will 
receive the same rewards as countries that are truly democratic. Data presented in this paper 
and the subsequent model output suggests that China is not faced with a soft power deficit in 
Africa due to its authoritarian rule. Rather it faces soft power gain due to its perceived 
democratic values and human rights record.  
 
We should be careful not to equate support for the Chinese model with support for 
authoritarian policies or authoritarian models for development. Rather, Africans view China 
as a democratic state that represents an alternative development model to the West. As 
highlighted in chapter three, African evaluations of the Chinese seem not be driven by 
political factors. When asked what contributes to positive evaluations of China, Africans 
mostly list economic reasons. The model reveals that that one of the drivers of Africans’ 















Meaning that if they think China is a positive influence they are more likely to opt for the 
Chinese model. Critically evaluations of power and influence also matters as respondents are 
more likely to choose China as role model for development if they perceive the Chinese as 
having a lot of influence in their country. Seemingly there is some attraction also in classic 
realist terms.  
4.3 Role model for democracies?  
The first puzzle is tied to the second. It seems counterintuitive, as the model shows, that 
respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model increases as regimes get more 
democratic. As shown by the Afrobarometer (R5) data China is perceived as a democracy by 
most Africans. Perception in this case is reality. The Chinese ‘democracy’ may well be 
perceived as an alternative type of democratic rule and respondents may be drawn towards 
China for its other attractive attributes. But this is only part of the answer and does not explain 
why respondents in democratic states are more likely to choose China. One plausible 
explanation is that Chinese involvement in authoritarian states is seen as benefiting the ruling 
class or elite. The benefits of aid and trade in authoritarian states tend to advantage a small 
ruling class rather than the broader public. In a democracy aiding the state is aiding the public 
as the nation is ruled by the people. While this may provide parts of the answer, unpacking the 
data further leads to a more complex picture. Bivariate analysis shows that regime type is not 
directly tied to evaluations of whether China is a positive or negative influence. Freedom 
House scores are not correlated with questions asking respondents to rate the merits of the 
Chinese impact in their own country. Even more perplexing is the fact that regime type is 
positively correlated with choice of model for development in bivariate analysis. Respondents 
are on average more likely to choose the China model for development if they live in 
authoritarian states (.064, p<.000). It is only when we control for the individual level variables 
that the relationship changes direction. This provides us with a puzzle and more research is 
needed before we can conclude on the relationship between regime type and support for the 









The findings outlined in the previous chapters hold important consequences for the debate 
around the Chinese engagement in Africa and for discussions around the China model. 
Empirical findings should replace the speculation that has fuelled much of the literature on 
China in Africa. The paper has established that China is perceived in a positive light by 
African respondents. Furthermore, China is seen as role model for development by a large 
portion of Africans. While meta-debates on what constitutes a developmental model are 
important, we need to recognize China is perceived as a viable alternative regardless of 
whether or not academics can agree on its integrity as a developmental alternative.  
Importance of the China model debate underlined 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to conclude on the merits of the Chinese involvement in 
Africa. Whether the increasing Chinese influence is transforming African nations into more 
democratic or authoritarian states is too early to call. As I have argued in chapter two the 
process of “China in Africa” is a complex social phenomenon. In the end Chinese investment 
and development assistance in Africa is not either good or bad. One way to measure the 
Chinese impact is to measure its influence on the “hard” material wellbeing of inhabitants in 
these countries. The metrics here would be well-known entities like HDI, GDP, education, 
inequality. In this arena China should be judged on the merits of its impact in individual 
African communities rather than to get an a priory stamp of malicious because it comes from 
an authoritarian regime. We should judge the Chinese rather a posteriory when we have 
evidence and experience to weight its impact.  
However, for those who argue that the African renaissance is built on deeper transformations 
of political culture and of sound governance increased Chinese influence in both hard and soft 
power raises some complex long term questions. What happens to norms over time as Chinese 
influence grows? And what impact does China have on development of democracy and 
human rights? In the realm of soft power the support for Chinese model should cause at least 




Matt Ferchen has argued for the importance of placing the China model on the research 
agenda.148 The findings of this paper support that notion. Due to lacking data researchers have 
so far focused on debating whether such a thing as a China model really exists. This paper 
finds that in Africa it does. Not only is China an alternative; on the African continent it is the 
second most popular choice of development model after the United States. In a third of our 
sampled countries it is the dominant choice. The debate needs to shift from abstract 
discussions on whether China truly represents an alternative, to concrete discussions about 
what it entails that such a large proportion of the African population identify China as the 
preferred model for their country’s development. If academic literature ignores this 
development we will fail to grasp an important dynamic shaping the future of Africa. A more 
assertive China can shape Africa in its image. Seemingly the door is open for growing 
Chinese involvement and influence. Not only in terms of hard exchange of trade and aid, but 
also on the softer exchange of ideas. African leaders are looking to China for advice and 
guidance on how to develop. According to the Afrobarometer data they are doing so with 
considerable popular support. For those invested in the long term development of the African 
continent, winning the “war of ideas” may be even more important than some race for 
dominance in terms of absolute numbers in trade and aid. In the long run these figures are also 
dependent on the convictions of African leaders and publics.  
The popularity of the Chinese model is part of, and as the regression model has showed; 
partly product of, a broader trend of Chinese popularity on the African continent. Chapter 
three has outlined surprising findings on the rate of popular support towards China in Africa. 
Research based on anecdotal evidence and media reports often claim that Africans are 
skeptical to the growing Chinese influence.149 Findings outlined in chapter three disputes this 
notion and indicate that these anecdotes do not reflect the broader trend. China is perceived as 
a positive influence on the political, economic and development arena in African states. 
Furthermore, China is viewed as a key player on the African continent with significant 
influence in individual African countries. Positive sentiments found in the Afrobarometer data 










Africans on the whole are quite positive to the growing Chinese influence on the continent.150 
This does not imply that all is rosy red in the China-Africa relationship. Respondents indicate 
reservations on several key areas like extraction of natural resources and depleation of jobs, 
but the overall tone is positive rather than negative.  
Why do people look to China? 
As demonstrated by the model in chapter four; positive evaluations of China’s engagement in 
the respondent’s respective countries are closely tied to their likelihood of choosing the 
Chinese model of development. It cannot be established from the model which way this 
relationship goes (i.e. the causal direction), but it seems fair to assume that perceptions of the 
Chinese influences peoples’ choice of development model. If so, one of the most important 
drivers is evaluations of the Chinese impact in the respondents own country. This makes 
intuitive sense. It is not the actual Chinese footprint, but how they perceive the Chinese 
impact that matters. The model reflects this. If anything it shows that an increased Chinese 
footprint decreases respondent likelihood of choosing the Chinese model.  
The model finds that individual values are non-significant in predicting respondents’ choice 
of development model. This finding put the paper somewhat at odds with the work of Gadzala 
and Hanusch who find that values on human rights and democracy are important predictors 
for perceptions of China’s Africa engagement. It is important to note that the paper uses a 
different dependent variable; Gadzala, Hanusch use a question that asks respondents how 
much help they think China is in their country. One could question whether the dependent 
variable used by Gadzala and Hanusch actually taps into a purely descriptive question that 
asks respondents to rate the level of help in economic terms. The question on development 
model grasps a broader dimension. This papers dependent variable also taps into a normative 
aspect that explores the direction respondents would like their country to be heading in. 
Furthermore, a close look at Gazala and Hanuch’s model reveals that the effect size of 
respondent values is miniscule (-0.01). It is only when values on democracy is run the vis-à-
vis analysis with evaluation of Western states that they have gain some effect size.151 Bearing 








democratic, it is interesting that respondent values should yield a statically significant impact 
at all. This paper finds that when it comes to choosing development model values do not 
distinguish those respondents who choose the Chinese model compared to those who choose 
‘other’.  
Importantly the national level variables reveal that some countries are more susceptible to 
Chinese influence then others. The model shows that China is role-model for less developed 
states. As country development level increases, the likelihood of respondents choosing the 
China model decreases. This finding makes intuitive sense and is what would be expected as 
China is itself a developing country. Richer countries prefer to model themselves the more 
highly developed Western states.  
While some of the findings make intuitive sense, others findings are less so. The paper offers 
support to Kurlantzick’s notion that increased Chinese soft power has made the Chinese 
model of development popular even free nations in the developing world.152 It finds that 
respondents nested within free and democratic states are more likely to choose the China 
model. The fears of alarmists like Kurlantzick and Halpern seems therefore to be grounded in 
some truth.  
Understanding the African choice of development model is important  
It may be that Shaun Breslin is right in assuming that the Chinese model is a metaphor for 
different rather than a specific set of policy prescriptions for development success. The model 
reveals that Africans do not tie China to any specific type of development path. Governance 
versus economic and infrastructure development does not shine out like the anticipated 
dichotomy. Rather, it seems that the Chinese model is popular because of a broader trend of 
Chinese popularity. People who view China as positive and powerful want to emulate its 
success. Skeptics like Stephan Halper may be right about the China model’s popularity and, if 
one believes the thermometer analogy, China’s is accumulating considerable soft power. 
However, as this paper shows it is too early to equate this with support for authoritarian rule 
or growing state intervention in development. As shown in chapter four; rather than 
promoting its authoritarian worldview China is seemly projecting a democratic mirage. What 






a general favorability of ‘China’, is difficult to root out. This may be an indication that the 
notion is relativistic and like all mirages it dependent on the perspective of the individual 
viewer.  
The data then reveals little demand in Africa for sudden authoritarian resurgence. The paper 
finds greater support for the notion of authors like Joshua Kurlantzick who argue that gradual 
policy shifts may over time undermine democracy. In this sense the threat may be that of 
ignorance and creeping reform rather than sudden authoritarian shock. Kurlantzick has argued 
that the increasing eagerness of African leaders to seek Chinese policy design and solutions 
could eventually help undermine democracy in vulnerable countries.153 Increased 
concentration of resources and power in the hands of the state and its elites is happening while 
the “democratic Chinese model” acts as the wool over the eyes of African publics. Ignorance 
can in this case be as dangerous as informed consent. If Africans blindly support wider 
Chinese engagement without conditions the developmental-Pandora’s Box may reveal 
problems later on. 
Other authors have warned of the frailty of individual democratic support in developing 
nations and how the appeal of the China model could over time shift them in a more 
authoritarian direction. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s worldwide survey of global 
democracy finds that the global financial crisis "has increased the attractiveness of the 
Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism for some emerging markets".154 In Southeast Asia 
Wibowo’s analysis of a decade of survey data reveals that many people in Southeast Asian 
share a willingness to abandon some of their democratic values for higher growth and a return 
to state-directed economic system that China is the main promoter of today.155 Yun-han Chu 












democracy in East Asia.” Chu finds that this is due in no small part to the great success of 
China.156 Future research should investigate whether this is the case in Africa as well.  
Consequences for the soft power literature   
If Joseph Nye is right about opinion polls being the ‘thermometer of soft power’ then China is 
seemly seemingly a soft power giant in Africa. It is worth noting that cross continental 
research by PEW indicates Africa is somewhat in a league of its own when it comes to 
positive evaluations of the Chinese. However, with PEWs limited sampling it is difficult to 
generalize and compare on an intercontinental scale. The findings of this paper challenge 
some of preconceived ideas around soft power. The data indicate that in Africa China does 
not suffer a soft power loss because of its autocratic rule. Perception is reality. China is 
perceived as democratic and can therefore harvest the democratic bonus that Nye claims 
exists for liberal democracies. 
The fact that China is making soft power headway in Africa and that the Chinese model is a 
component of that development has not been lost on policy makers on the ground. Former 
U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Hormats has made it clear that “the model of state-led 
capitalism is being used as an instrument of China's soft power" in Africa. To Hormats it is 
part of a greater notion “that China's economic model is successful and can be used 
elsewhere."157 Future academic research needs to take these concerns seriously and devote 
more of its pages to exploring the effects of Chinese soft power.  
The road ahead  
The findings of this paper support the notion that there is a need for an increased focus of 
academic literature towards the Chinese model. Time series data collected through repeated 
surveys is needed to measure the long term tendencies. This paper shows that China has 
established itself as a major soft power in Africa. However, as questions on China are only 
sporadically included in surveys it cannot be established whether this is a trend over time. 
Furthermore, future research needs to unpack further how Africans view the Chinese and their 








additional detail level analysis is needed. As China’s presence grows in Africa scholarly work 




The paper has found considerable support for the China model in Africa. China was the 
second most popular choice of development model after the United States. In ten of the 
surveyed countries it was the dominant choice. Chapter three showed that Africans are on 
average positive towards the Chinese engagement on the continent. This finding supports the 
conclusions of the limited body of previous research that has empirically measured African 
public perceptions towards the Chinese.  
The multilevel regression model employed in chapter four demonstrated that respondents who 
offer positive evaluations of China’s engagement in their own country are much more likely 
to choose the Chinese model for development. Individual values on democracy and individual 
preferences on development are not found to influence choice of development model. 
Respondents nested within ‘freer’ societies are, surprisingly, more likely to choose the 
Chinese model of development. This finding supports claims made by scholars like 
Kurlantzick and Halpern who argue that the China model is seen as attractive even to 
respondents living in democratic countries. The likelihood of respondents choosing the 
Chinese model decreases as a country’s level of development increases. Increased Chinese 
presence in the form of aid and foreign direct investment is found to make respondents less 
likely to choose the China model. In contrast, increased imports from China are found to 
increase the likelihood that respondents will choose China as their model for their country’s 
development.   
Chapter five shows that one is mistaken to suggest that the popularity of the China model in 
Africa implies support for authoritarian rule. The Chinese democratic mirage is blurring the 
picture and attracting respondents across the value spectrum. The paper concludes that further 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Country Ohio U. Database 2001 Estimates, 2006-2015 
Algeria  2,000 35,000-50,000               (2010) 
Angola 500 40,000-70,000               (2009-
2010) 
Benin  --- 4000                  (2010) 
Botswana  40 10,000               (2010) 
Burkina Faso --- 1,000                 (2007) 
Burundi --- 200                    (2010)  
Cameroon  50 2500                  (2008) 
Cape Verde --- 3000                  (2011) 
Central African Rep.   300                   (2012) 
Chad --- 300                    (2008) 
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Congo (Brazzaville)  15,000-20,000               (2013) 
Congo (Demo. Rep.) 200 12,000               (2015) 
Cote d’Ivoire  200 10,000               (2007) 
Equatorial Guinea ---- 2000-4000         (2008) 
Egypt 110 10,000               (2015) 
Ethiopia  100 30,000               (2014) 
Gambia  300                    (2012) 
Ghana  500 50,000               (2013) 
10,000               (2015) 
Guinea --- 5000                  (2007) 
Kenya  190 7,000                 (2014) 
10,000               (2015) 
40,000               (2015) 
50,000               (2015) 
Lesotho  1000 5,000                 (2012) 
Liberia  120   600                  (2006) 
Libya 500 3,000                 (2011)  
Madagascar  30,000 70,000-100,00                    
(2011) 
Malawi 40 2,000                 (2007) 
Mali --- 2000                  (2009) 
Mauritius 40,000 (ethnic Chinese) 30,000+             (2008) 
6,700 (Chinese  (2010)  
Citizens) 
Morocco -- 1,000                 (2015) 
Mozambique  700 7,000-12,000                  
(2007) 
Namibia  --- 4000                  (2008) 
Niger 20  
Nigeria  2000 20,000               (2012) 
Reunion 25,000 30,000               (2010) 
Rwanda  700                    (2014) 
Sao Tome & Principe 100  
Senegal  -- 2,000                 (2010) 
Seychelles 2,000  
Sierra Leone 20 400-500            (2008) 
South Africa  30,000 over 300,000    (2015) 
500,000            (2015) 
Sudan  45 24,000               (2012) 
Swaziland 90 300                    (2006) 
Tanzania  600 10,000               (2008) 
Togo  50 4,000                 (2010) 
Tunisia --- 2,000                 (2011) 
Uganda  100 10,000               (2012) 
Zambia  150 6000-7000         (2008) 
Zimbabwe  300 10,000               (2013) 
 
